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Federal Discovery: A Survey of Local Rules




Traditionally, except for the limited role played by pleadings
and bills of particulars, the attorney in a law court did not disclose
evidentiary matters until trial.' "A judicial proceeding was a battle
of wits rather than a search for the truth,"'2 and thus, each side was
protected to a large extent against disclosure of his case until counsel
chose to disclose it at trial. This philosophy changed some forty years
ago with the introduction of discovery in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. In the words of Mr. Justice Murphy, the discovery rules
meant that "civil trials in the federal courts no longer need be carried
on in the dark. The way is now clear, consistent with recognized
privileges, for the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of
the issues and facts before trial."'3 Or, as another observer saw it,
"[m]odern instruments of discovery. . . together with pretrial pro-
cedures make a trial less a game of blind man's bluff and more a fair
contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practic-
able extent."'
The 1938 federal discovery rules maintained the basic premise of
the adversary system. It was left to counsel to determine how to
proceed in discovery matters. A matter came before a judge only
when there was an objection or a failure to carry out discovery. Thus,
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
This Article was written under a contract with the Federal Judicial Center, and
draws upon data obtained in a survey of the federal courts conducted by the Center,
noted throughout the Article. A staff paper prepared by Thad M. Guyer of the Federal
Judicial Center was also a fundamental aid in the preparation of this Article. T. GUYER,
SURvEY oF LocAL CiLva DIscovEY PRocEDuREs (FJC Staff Paper 77-1, 1977).
The conclusions reached and opinions expressed in this Article are solely those of
the author, and are not attributable to the Federal Judicial Center.
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1. Although the law courts had no discovery in a sense recognizable today, an
attorney could file a "bill of discovery" in an equity court for use in a law court, but
the device was cumbersome. See Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 241 F. 964,
966-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). Equity courts did provide much more discovery. See generally
F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 171-73 (2d ed. 1977).
2. 8 C. WIoHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001 (1969).
3. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
4. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682-83 (1958) (Douglas,
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a deposition was to operate without the intervention of a judge unless
the deponent or a party sought a protective order,' or unless a depo-
nent failed to appear for a deposition or refused to answer a question
and a sanction was requested.' Interrogatories were to operate extra-
judicially unless an objection was made, whereupon the matter was
automatically set down for court ruling.' Requests for documents and
for physical or mental examinations were exceptions; they were to go
to a judge upon motion and good cause shown..
In 1970, the discovery rules were overhauled to reflect the experi-
ence of the preceding three decades. One purpose was to reduce the
time that judges were to spend on discovery matters." Objections to
interrogatories no longr go automatically to a judge for ruling, but
await the interrogator's decision as to whether the objection is well
taken, whether the information might be obtained by some other
means, and whether the matter is important enough to warrant judi-
cial intervention." Also, the good cause requirement for motions to
force the production of documents and other tangible things'" has
been replaced by a mere request of another party for the production
of such items.'" Again, a court becomes involved only when the party
requesting discovery seeks an order compelling production that was
refused or objected to.' 4 Thus, the mold of federal discovery, particu-
larly as recast in 1970, is to leave the discovery process to counsel.
As then District Judge Kaufman observed, "the whole discovery pro-
cedure contemplates an absence of judicial intervention in the run-
of-the-mill discovery attempt."' 5 A court becomes involved only when
a dispute arises between counsel and a motion for a protective order"
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b) (1938). Citations to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
as originally enacted in 1938 are indicated by that date. Many of these have since been
renumbered and otherwise altered by the amendments discussed in the text accom-
panying notes 9-14 infra.
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a) (1938).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 33 (1938).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (1938).
9. See, e.g., COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL PROJECr FOR EFFECnVE JusTIcE, FLD SuRWaY
OF FEDERAL PRETRiAL DiscovERY (1964) (study conducted under the direction of Profes-
sor Maurice Rosenberg of Columbia Law School, referred to in the Explanatory State-
ment Concerning the 1970 Amendments of the Discovery Rules, United States Judicial
Conference) [hereinafter cited as FmL SuRvEY].
10. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a), Notes of Advisory Committee on 1970 Amend-
ment, 28 U.S.C. app. 455 (1976); FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a), Notes of Advisory Committee
on 1970 Amendment, 28 U.S.C. app. 458 (1976); Brown, Proposed Changes to Rule 33
Interrogatories and Rule 37 Sanctions, 11 Asuz. L. REv. 443, 446-47 (1969).
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (1938).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b).
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
15. Kaufman, Judicial Control Over Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 111, 116 (1960).
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
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or a request to compel discovery or for sanctions is brought.'7
While discovery appears to work well in the vast majority of
cases, 8 serious problems have arisen. Chief Justice Burger has noted
that "there is a widespread belief that pretrial procedures are being
used excessively and the process is lengthening litigation.""8 In par-
ticular, he observed, "[eJxcessive use of pretrial discovery can be
used as a weapon against a financially weak litigant.""° The press has
characterized discovery as being "insanely expensive and very nearly
endless."2 ' A task force established by the American Bar Association
(ABA) as a follow-up on the National Conference on the Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice in April
1976, stated:
Substantial criticism has been leveled at the operation of the rules
of discovery.["] It is alleged that abuse is widespread, serving to
escalate the cost of litigation, to delay adjudication unduly and to
coerce unfair settlements. Ordeal by pretrial procedures, it has been
said, awaits the parties to a civil law suit.23
These abuses are attributed to counsel who use discovery for
fishing expeditions, who roam widely under a discovery scheme that
permits inquiry generally into any matter within the "subject matter
involved in the pending action,"2 who delay completion of discovery,
and who force undue expense on opposing counsel by extensive inter-
rogatories, by requests for production of unnecessarily large numbers
of documents, and by production of documents in large, unorganized
lots in response to interrogatories and production requests. 2
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
18. The first finding we brought back from the field was that Federal
discovery is on the whole working well and doing the main work it was
intended to do ....
... [O]n the whole there is no sign of major disenchantment or disas-
trous malfunctioning in the pretrial discovery system as it now operates.
Rosenberg, Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, 45 F.R.D. 479, 488, 490
(1968)(commenting upon FIELD SuRvEy, supra note 9).
19. How to Break Logjam in Courts, U.S. NEws & Wonw REP., Dec. 19, 1977,
at 21, 24 (interview with Chief Justice Burger).
20. Id.
21. Editorial, Pretrial Punishment, Bus. WmE, Dec. 12, 1977, at 162.
22. Here the task force cites to Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good
Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199, 202-04 (1976); Rifkind, Are We Asking Too
Much of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 96, 107 (1976).
23. ABA, REPORT OF POUND CONFERENCE FoLLow-UP TASK FORCE 27 (1976). See
Griffin, Discovery: A Criticism of the Practice, 1 FORUM 11, 13 (1966) (published by
the ABA Section of Insurance, Negligence, and Compensation Law) ("The aim [of
discovery] is admirable ... [blut it has not been achieved. Open-book discovery is
an albatross around the neck of the trial bar .
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
25. Although an unlimited number of examples of discovery abuses could be
shown, two illustrations will suffice:
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As the abuses in discovery have surfaced, proposals for reform
have again been made. Two major proposals for changes in the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure are those of the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules of the United States Judicial Conference," and of a Spe-
cial Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse of the ABA Section
of Litigation.? Still other proposals have emerged from a Second
Circuit Commission on the Reduction of Burdens and Costs in Civil
Litigation.?
I recall that on one occasion when we were representing a taxi company,
counsel for the plaintiff served us with a printed set of interrogatories asking
the defendant corporation whether it had a driver's license, where it learned
to drive, whether it was married or divorced, and even asked the taxi com-
pany whether it had any children.
Savell, Basic Use of Discovery Procedures-Some Practical Problems, 3 FORUM 197,
199-200 (1968) (published by the ABA Section on Insurance, Negligence and Com-
pensation Law). A similar problem was noted in Blanchard Lumber Co. v. S.S. Poly-
rover, 224 F. Supp. 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), where Judge Weinfeld described a set of
150 interrogatories as "of a drag-net nature, which not only are unduly burdensome
and oppressive, but seek information irrelevant to the fundamental issue in this suit."
Id. at 602.
Two major aspects of the problem should be noted. First, the adversary system
gives a dual role to counsel. Counsel is torn between often irreconcilable obligations:
to ultimate justice, in his capacity as an officer of the court, and to his client, to whom
the desire for triumph is paramount even at justice's expense. It is in the defending
party's interest to utilize those tactics which will cause delay or extra expense to the
opponent. Conversely, it is often in the plaintiff's interest to make discovery so exten-
sive and so expensive as to make a "good' settlement appear cheap in comparison.
Second, there is the search for the proper role of the trial judge in a system overbur-
dened with cases. As noted earlier, the philosophy of modern discovery is premised
upon minimizing judicial involvement in the discovery process. Even with the current
rules, however, there is a feeling on the part of some that too much judicial time is
now being consumed in discovery matters. Yet, if courts are to become further involved
in controlling counsel's action or inaction in the use of discovery, in order to work
toward the ultimate goal of "just, speedy, and inexpensive" determination of contro-
versies, FED. R. Civ. P. 1, more court time necessarily will have to be devoted to polic-
ing discovery.
26. COMMr IEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAr OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Mar. 1978), reprinted in 77 F.R.D. 613 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as 1978 PROPOSED DRAFT]. A revised draft was issued by the Advisory Committee
in February 1979, reprinted with separate pagination in 588 F.2d (Supp. No. 2, Feb.
12, 1979) and 461 F. Supp. (Supp. No. 2, Feb. 12, 1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979
REVISED DRAFT].
As of this writing, the Revised Preliminary Draft is before the bar for comment.
If finally adopted by the Advisory Committee on Rules and Practice to the United
States Judicial Conference, and in turn by the Judicial Conference to the United
States Supreme Court, the proposed change may be promulgated in early 1980. Should
this timetable succeed, the effective date of any changes probably will be July 1, 1980.
27. ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY
OF DISCOVERY ABUSE (pamphlet Oct. 1977) [hereinafter cited as ABA COMMITTEE].
28. In November 1977, Chief Judge Kaufman of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals appointed a private commission of jurists, attorneys, and legal sct~olars to
consider proposals to "bring reason and measure to the opening rites of a trial."
[Vol. 63:253
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Although serious attention must be paid to each of these major
proposals, there is another source that should also be considered in
deciding what, if any, changes in procedure should be made. Some
federal district courts, and many individual judges, have used their
local rulemaking authority under Rule 83 to meet perceived problems
in discovery.2 This Article examines these local attempts to limit the
consumption of judicial resources, to expedite the discovery process,
to curb abuses in the use of discovery methods and to provide for
more effective sanctions. A comparison is made between these local
practices and the reforms that have been proposed by the Advisory
Committee, the ABA, and the Second Circuit Commission.
This Article is based on an examination of the local rules of the
district courts0 and an informal survey of federal district courts by
the Federal Judicial Center." In January 1977, questionnaires were
Telephone Interview with Commission Secretary Robert D. Lipscher (Oct. 28, 1978).
The other members of the Commission are: Hon. Irving R. Kaufman; Alan J. Hruska
and Michael I. Sovern, Co-chairmen; and Hon. Arnold Bauman; Hon. Charles L.
Brieant, Jr.; John Doar; Leonard Garment; James C. Goodale; Fannie J. Klein;
Arthur L. Liman; James M. Nabrit, I; Hon. Edward R. Neaher; Hon. Jon 0. New-
man; Hon. James L. Oakes; Hon. Lawrence W. Pierce; Hon. Simon H. Rifkind; Whit-
ney North Seymour; Hon. Harold R. Tyler, Jr.; and William E. Willis.
29. The rule gives each court the discretionary power to "make and amend rules
governing its practice not inconsistent with [the federal] rules." FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
This power is by no means a novelty, for federal courts have possessed local rulemaking
power almost since the federal judiciary was first organized:
[I]t shall be lawful for the several courts of the United States, from time to
time, as occasion may require, to make rules and orders for their respective
courts directing the returning of writs and processes, the filing of declarations
and other pleadings, the taking of rules, the entering and making up judg-
ments by default, and other matters in the vacation and otherwise in a
manner not repugnant to the laws of the United States, to regulate the
practice of the said courts respectively, as shall be fit and necessary for the
advancement of justice, and especially to that end to prevent delays in
proceedings.
Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 7, 1 Stat. 335 (1793). Nor is Rule 83 unique in statu-
torily granting such power. "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of
Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business.
Such rules shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and proce-
dure prescribed by the Supreme Court .... " 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976) (emphasis
added).
For a discussion of the federal rulemaking power, see Weinstein, Reform of Federal
Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM. L. Rxv. 905 (1976). See also Note, Rule 83
and the Local Federal Rules, 67 COLUM. L. Ray. 1251 (1967); Comment, The Local
Rules of Civil Procedure in the Federal District Courts-A Survey, 1966 DuKE L.J.
1011.
30. The source used in this examination was the looseleaf service published by
Callaghan & Co., updated through June 1978. FEDERAL LocAL Couir RuLEs (Callaghan
1978).
31. Information gathered through the efforts of the Federal Judicial Center is
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sent to the clerk of each federal district court. Responses were re-
ceived concerning the practices of approximately ninety percent of
those courts, and some follow-through inquiry has been made. Al-
though what is reported here is not represented as a complete index
of current practices, the survey has uncovered a fait sampling of
current practices and should therefore be of value in solving the prob-
lems of modem federal discovery.
II. CONSUMPTION OF JUDICIAL RESOURCES
IN THE DISCOVERY PROCESS
Judge time has been called "our most precious judicial re-
source."32 Many district judges have attempted to conserve that re-
source by reducing the time they must spend in supervising the dis-
covery process. Yet, the need to ensure that the discovery process
works, that discovery does not inordinately delay the flow of litiga-
tion, and that the discovery process is not abused calls for additional
investment of judge time. These competing themes are apparent both
in the district judges' responses to discovery problems and in the
current proposals for reform.
In 1968, Congress passed the Federal Magistrates Act,3 as an
attempt to conserve judge time. The Act authorized judges to
"designate a magistrate to hear and determine any pretrial matter
pending before the court" in a civil case, except for certain matters. 4
cited in this Article as SURVEY. References to the practices of individual judges
mentioned in this Article are current with respect to the position and activities of the
judges as of the time of the survey-winter 1977.
32. Becker, Efficient Use of Judicial Resources, 43 F.R.D. 421, 422 (1967).
33. Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, tit. I, § 101, 82 Stat. 1107
(1968) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-39 (1976)) (expanding areas in which magistrates
may be used). Further expansion of permissible magistrate jurisdiction is provided
in S. 1613, which passed the Senate by voice vote on July 22, 1977, 123 CONG. REc.
S12647 (daily ed. July 22, 1977), and was approved for consideration by the House on
September 29, 1978, 124 CONG. REc. H1l1Sl (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1978) (consideration
was granted upon adoption of House Resolution 1322). As the House version differed
from that of the Senate, the bill went to a conference committee. See 124 CONG. REc.
H11283-87 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1978) (bill reported by the Committee of the Whole; dis-
cussion ended and no resolution made thereon). The Conference Committee made no
report before the adjournment of Congress, and the bill died.
34. 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A) (1976). The magistrate's determination of pretrial
matters shall be "final," subject only to ultimate right of review by a district court
judge. See H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10, reprinted in [19761 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6162.
The exceptions to the authority of a judge to designate a magistrate to hear and
determine any pretrial matter include
a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary
judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or information made by the
defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to dismiss or to permit
[Vol. 63:253
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Of particular note is the statutory authorization for a judge to desig-
nate a magistrate to handle discovery matters. Congress has also
expressly invited the federal courts to make use of magistrates in
matters short of the trial itself.35
The congressional invitation has not, however, met with univer-
sal acceptance. Of the 94 federal district courts surveyed, only four-
teen reported that the entire court has provided for the use of magis-
trates in discovery proceedings through either a local rule or a general
court directive. 6 In some other districts, magistrates are used in
discovery matters by individual judges in the absence of a local rule
or general court directive. For example, although the Southern Dis-
trict of New York has no local rule or general court directive providing
for the use of magistrates in discovery matters, 15 of the 31 judges
on the court reported making use of magistrates to assist in discovery
matters. Similarly, several of the fifteen judges on the District
Court of the District of Columbia use magistrates for this purpose.
Where magistrates are used in discovery matters, their actual
duties appear to vary. In some districts, all civil discovery matters are
routinely assigned to magistrates.38 In two others, "most" civil discov-
ery was reported to be routinely routed to magistrates. In at least
maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an action.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1976).
35. If district judges are willing to experiment with the assignment to
magistrates of other functions in aid of the business of the courts,. . . there
will be increased time available to judges for the careful and unhurried
performance of their vital and traditional adjudicatory duties, and a conse-
quent benefit to both efficiency and the quality of justice in the Federal
Court.
S. REP. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1967).
36. S.D. FLA. GEN. R. 25(C)(2); N.D. & S.D. IowAMAGis. R. 37(c)(3)(d); D. KAN.
R. 36(I)(a)(1); E.D. LA. R. 20.5(a); W.D. LA. R. 28(B)-(C); E.D. MICH. R.
XXVIII(c)(2)(a); D. NaB. R. 41(C)(2); D.N.H.R. 10(a); D.P.R.R. 13(B), General Order
of Referral to the Magistrate; D.R.I.R. 32 (a)(2); S.D. Tax. R., 24(C)(2); E.D. WASH.
R. 27. The Chief Deputy Clerk for the District of Maine notes, "In the District of Maine
an attempt is made to refer most discovery pleadings to the Magistrate for resolution
and not to the court." SURvaY, supra note 31. Judge Doyle of the Western District of
Wisconsin states, "In most routine cases, the full-time Magistrate or occasionally the
clerk-magistrate supervises as needed the operation of discovery." Id.
37. These are Judges Bonsal, Brieant, Cannella, Carter, Duffy, Frankel, Goettel,
Haight, Knapp, Lasker, Owen, Ryan, Stewart, Weinfeld, and Wyatt. See SURVEY,
supra note 31.
38. D. KAN. R. 36(I)(2); D.N.H.R. 10; N.D.N.Y.R. 43(c)(3); D.P.R.R. 13(B),
General Order of Referral to the Magistrate; E.D. WASH. GEN. R. 9(d), 27(a)(7);
SURVEY, supra note 31 (W.D. La.).
39. These are the District of Maine and the Western District of Wisconsin. See
SURVEY, supra note 31.
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one district, the practice is to refer discovery matters to a magistrate
only in simple cases, such as tort and contract matters, while dis-
covery in more complex cases-such as those involving civil rights,
copyright, patent, or antitrust-is reserved for direct judge supervi-
sion.4 0 Even within a single jurisdiction, the practice may vary. The
Southern District of New York is illustrative. Three of fifteen judges
who reportedly use magistrates do so in all cases,4' while eleven of the
remaining twelve do so only when discovery is expected to be pro-
tracted, complex, or unusual, or when counsel do not cooperate with
one another.2
When a magistrate handles discovery matters, it is generally as
part of a reference of all or most pretrial matters involved in the
particular case.43 Some jurisdictions even have the magistrate handle
the final pretrial order.4 In others, the final pretrial conference and
order are specifically reserved for the judge.15
A magistrate's decision may be reversed by the trial judge to
whom the case is assigned." Although some local rules and standing
orders address this point, most do not. The Northern and Southern
Districts of Iowa, for example, provide by local rule that a party
adversely affected by an order of a magistrate may appeal to the
district judge by filing a motion to review within ten days of the
magistrate's order. 7 Former District Judge Frankel of the Southern
District of New York limited the right to judicial review by providing
that magistrates' discovery orders are final unless appealed within
ten days." Of course, a court always has the inherent power to make
an exception in order to review a magistrate's ruling in the interest
of justice, no matter how final the local rule or standing order at-
tempts to make the magistrate's order. 9
40. This is the District of Maine. See SURVY, supra note 31.
41. These are Judges Carter, Stewart, and Wyatt. Id.
42. These are Judges Bonsal, Brieant, Cannella, Duffy, Geottel, Haight, Knapp,
Lasker, Owen, Ryan, and Weinfeld. Id. Judge Frankel, however, refers all but complex
and protracted cases to a magistrate. Id.
43. See, e.g., D.P.R.R. 13(B), General Order of Referral to the Magistrate.
44. See, e.g., U.S. MAGIs. R. 1(f)(1); D. ALASKA GEN. R. 30(e)(2); D. CONN. R.
11(e); D.D.C.R. 3-8(b).
45. See, e.g., D.N.H.R. 10(b).
46. See note 34 supra.
47. N.D. & S.D. IOWA MAGIS. R. 37(C)(3). A similar rule, providing only a five-
day limit, is E.D. LA. R. 20.11(a).
48. Under Judge Frankel's standing order, in all but unusual civil cases, counsel
are ordered that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1976), a magistrate's decision
on discovery motions "shall become final unless within ten (10) days following issuance
of such decision, a motion is made for review upon the asserted ground that the
Magistrate's order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law." SURWVY, supra note 31.
49. H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-10, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
[Vol. 63:253
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Thus, various district judges have used magistrates in an at-
tempt to reduce the drain on judge time occasioned by the discovery
process. While use of magistrates is undoubtedly cheaper than the
use of federal district judges,50 there clearly is a cost in terms of
salaries, support staff, space, and other factors. The Second Circuit
Commission has, however, proposed an experiment which, if success-
ful, would furnish additional judicial resources at no direct cost to the
federal budget. The Commission proposed in April 1978 that a pilot
project be undertaken in the Southern District of New York to use
attorneys to serve, without compensation, as "volunteer masters" in
civil casesA' The volunteer master would convene a meeting of coun-
sel or the parties early in the case. The master would analyze the
pleadings and other papers, review the pertinent documentary mate-
rials, explore the possibility of mediating and settling the contro-
versy, assist the parties in the preparation of a statement of the issues
that appear to be involved, seek to clarify and narrow those issues,
seek stipulation of facts on which the parties agree at that stage, and
endeavor to work out with the parties a plan of discovery. At the
termination of these proceedings, the volunteer master would make
a written report to the trial judge on the matters agreed upon and
those on which agreement could not be reached.
Certainly such a system, if successful, would aid the discovery
CONG. & AD. NEws 6162. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). See
generally Sear, Proceedings of Seminar for Newly Appointed United States District
Judges, 75 F.R.D. 89, 254 (1976).
50. Increasing the number of magistrates is also a somewhat easier task. Their
number may be increased, and magistrates assigned to specific federal districts, by the
United States Judicial Conference under 28 U.S.C. § 633(b)-(c) (1970). Although Con-
gress exercises ultimate control over magistrates' appointments through the appropria-
tion process, this method is undoubtedly more expeditious than authorizing the crea-
tion of additional federal district judgeships.
51. The Commission stated:
The Commission is mindful of the fact that at the very time the courts
are obliged to devote a progressively larger portion of their efforts to criminal
litigation, there have been substantial increases in the number, magnitude
and complexity of civil suits. Less judicial time spent on civil litigation
means less judicial control, lengthening delays, burgeoning expenses, fewer
opportunities for mediation and settlement-in a highly practical sense,
diminished access to the court for litigants who cannot afford these burdens,
expenses and delays.
There is a considerable possibility that these problems could be alle-
viated if a large number of highly qualified trial lawyers were brought into
the system to perform a variety of para-judicial functions. One means of
gauging whether such volunteer masters could effectively and fairly dis-
charge responsibilities of this nature would be to try the program on a small,
experimental scale.
Second Circuit Commission on the Reduction of Burdens and Costs in Civil Litigation,
Volunteer Masters Pilot Program (Apr. 10, 1978) (unpublished report).
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process. By narrowing and defining disputed issues at a preliminary
stage, and by stipulating as to facts on which there clearly is no
disagreement, the amount of discovery needed would be reduced.
Moreover, the Second Circuit Commission proposal is intriguing in
allowing for greater involvement of the bar in policing itself, as well
as for its potential of furnishing additional resources at little or no
cost to the taxpayer. There is no reason, however, why these tasks
could not now be assigned to magistrates. But no evidence was uncov-
ered in the Survey that any district judge-including those who are
members of the Commission-is now using magistrates in the manner
suggested by the Commission.
Another device used by district courts to conserve judicial time
is a requirement that, before a discovery motion is filed, counsel must
confer and attempt to resolve the problem. Fifty-five of the 94 fed-
eral districts have adopted rules requiring that an attorney making
a discovery motion must first attempt to resolve the discovery prob-
lems without court intervention. 52 These rules vary from court to
court. Some consist of merely a requirement that counsel confer in
an attempt to resolve differences prior to submission of a discovery
motion or prior to a hearing on that motion. 3 Other courts require
a comprehensive certification or affidavit to the court. The local rule
of the District of Puerto Rico is illustrative:
With respect to all motions and objections relating to discovery
... counsel for each of the parties shall meet and confer in advance
of the hearing in a good faith effort to narrow the areas of disagree-
ment to the greatest possible extent. It shall be the responsibility of
counsel for the movant to arrange for the conference. To curtail
undue delay in the administration of justice, this Court hereinafter
refuses to hear any and all motions for discovery and production of
documents unless moving counsel shall first advise the Court, in
writing, that after personal consultation and attempts to resolve
52. D. Amz. Civ. R. 42(A)(2)[b]; C.D. CALIF. R. 3(1); E.D. CALIF. Civ. R. 114(c);
N.D. CAUF. Civ. R. 230(4); S.D. CALIF. R. 3(e)9; D. COLO. R. 5(g); M.D. FLA. GEN. R.
3.04(a); N.D. FIA. GEN. R. 8(A); S.D. FLA. GEN. R. 10(I)(2); N.D. GA. R. 91.62; E.D.
ILL. R. 4(e); N.D. ILL. GEN. R. 12(d); S.D. IL.. R. 11; N.D. IND. R. 7(e); S.D. IND. R.
11; N.D. & S.D. IowA Civ. R. 16(E); E.D. LA. R. 3.11; M.D. LA. GEN. R. 5(D); W.D.
LA. R. 10(1); D. ME. R. 15(b); D. MD. GEN. R. 34; D. MAss. R. 15(e); E.D. MicH. R.
IX(k); D. MINN. R. 5; E.D. Mo. R. VII(c)(5); D. NEB. R. 20(J); D. NEv. Civ. R.
17(A)(4)(b); D.N.H.R. 14(c); D.N.J. GEN. R. 12(G); D.N.M.R. 10(c); E.D.N.Y. GEN.
R. 9(f); S.D.N.Y. GEN. R. 9(f); N.D.N.Y. GEN. R. 46; M.D.N.C. Civ. R. 21(k);
W.D.N.C. GEN. R. 8(A); D.N.D.R. IV(F)(3); N.D. OHIO CIv. R. 3(d)(6); S.D. OHIO R.
3.7.1; N.D. OKLA. R. 14(d); W.D. OKLA. R. 13(d); D. ORE. Civ. R. 12(b); E.D. PA. R.
25(d); M.D. PA. R. 301.02(e); W.D. PA. R. 4(a)(2); D.P.R.R. 8(M); D.R.I.R. 13(e);
W.D. TENN. R. 9(d); S.D. TEx. R. 16(G); W.D. TEX. R. 14(n); E.D. VA. R. 11(K); E.D.
WASH. GEN. R. 9(b); W.D. WASH. Civ. R. CR 37(g), (h); E.D. Wis. R. 6, § 6.02; W.D.
Wis. R. 8(d).
53. See, e.g., D. ME. R. 16; E.D. MIcH. R. IX(k); S.D. OHIO R. 3.7.
[Vol. 63:253
LOCAL DISCOVERY RULES
differences, counsel are unable to reach an accord. This statement
shall recite, in addition, the date, time and place of such conference,
and the names of all parties participating therein.5'
The local rules requiring counsel to consult do not seem to be
wholly successful. Some courts have found it necessary, upon the
filing of a discovery motion, automatically to mail a form order di-
recting counsel to meet in advance of the hearing and to confer in a
good faith effort to settle all objections and opposed matters.55 Other
courts routinely send a memorandum to counsel, detailing the court's
philosophy that counsel are to work discovery matters out on their
own.51 One district judge, moreover, despite the existence of a local
rule requiring counsel to confer and to certify to the court that the
conference has taken place,57 has found it necessary to notify counsel
in civil actions that 25% of all motions filed in civil cases in that divi-
sion involve discovery controversies, to admonish counsel that most
of these disputes could have been avoided by a realistic attitude
toward discovery, and to insist that counsel cooperate to prevent a
waste of the court's time.5
It is noteworthy that both the ABA Committee and the Advisory
Committee, in proposing a discovery conference procedure, require
that a request for such a conference be accompanied by a statement
that requesting counsel has made "a reasonable effort to reach
agreement with opposing attorneys on the matters set forth in the
request" for the conference. 9 In both proposals, as well, there are
explicit provisions permitting the imposition of sanctions for failure
54. D.P.R.R. 8(M). See also D. Aiz. Civ. R. 42(2)[b]; C.D. CAL. R. 3(k).
55. See, e.g., E.D. MICH. R. IX(k), and the standing order of Judge Pratt ordering
counsel to meet and stipulate whatever issues remain in dispute, as required by local
rule IX(k). This order is sent whenever a motion relating to discovery is filed. See
SUVEY, supra note 31.
56. These districts include the Central District of California, the Eastern Dis-
trict of Louisiana, and the Western District of Pennsylvania. See SuRvEY, supra note
31. The California memo quotes from Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507-08 (1947):
[T]he deposition:discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal
treatment. No longer can the cry of "fishing expedition" serve to preclude a
party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case. Mutual
knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to
proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge
whatever he has in his possession.57. S.D. FLA. Gm . R. 10(1)(2).
58. Chief Judge C. Clyde Atkins, Southern District of Florida, "Notice to
Counsel." See SuRvsy, supra note 31.
59. 1979 REVISED DRAr, supra note 26, at 3 (proposal for new Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(f)(5)). The ABA Committee proposal for new Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(c)(5) requires "a certification that counsel has conferred, or made
reasonable effort to confer, with opposing counsel concerning the matters set forth in
the request." ABA COMmTrrEE, supra note 27, at 4.
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to confer in a good faith effort to reach agreement.' It appears,
however, that no court has imposed a sanction for failure to confer
in good faith prior to taking a discovery matter to court as required
by local rules. Perhaps the committee proposals, if adopted, may
lead to serious attempts to reduce the burden of what one judge has
termed "silly discovery motions."'6 Past experience, however, must
lead to some skepticism. Only further experience will tell.
Ill. ENCOURAGING COUNSEL TO BEGIN AND TO
TERMINATE DISCOVERY AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE
A frequent criticism of discovery is that it drags on for an inordi-
nate amount of time. When one considers that, in at least one dis-
trict, the median time for substantial completion of discovery is 434
days for an average of only 5.4 discovery requests per case, there
appears to be some objective basis for this criticism.62 The Federal
60. See ABA CoMMIrrEE, supra note 27, at 23-25 (proposal for new Federal
Rule 37(e)); 1979 REvisED DRAFr, supra note 26, at 19 (Advisory Committee proposal
for same). The ABA version makes explicit reference to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976),
which now provides a basis for a personal cost sanction against counsel. The Advisory
Committee proposal provides for a personal cost sanction against a party or counsel
without a reference to 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
61. SURVEY, supra note 31 (note of Judge Grady, N.D. Illinois).
62. The validity of the criticism that discovery consumes an inordinate amount
of time has been challenged by a recent study, at least as the criticism applies to
ordinary litigation. This conclusion results from a Federal Judicial Center study of
approximately 500 cases from each of six metropolitan federal districts: Central
District of California, Southern District of Florida, Eastern District of Louisiana,
District of Maryland, District of Massachusetts, and Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania. Each case selected had been terminated during fiscal 1975. FEDERAL JUDIMAL
CENTER, CASE MANAGEMENT AND CoURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES DisTrncr
CouRTs 18 (1977) (part of the District Court Study Series) [hereinafter cited as CASE
MANAGEMENT STUDY].
Examining some 890 cases filed in these federal districts, the study revealed that
of those cases in which discovery was substantially completed before the case was
terminated, an average of only 6.26 discovery requests were made. Id. at 26, table 11.
The average number of discovery requests per case varied from 4.48 in the Eastern
District of Louisiana, to 8.61 in the Southern District of Florida. Discovery requests
included all depositions, interrogatories, requests for admission, requests for produc-
tion of documents, and motions for physical or mental examination noticed or made
by all parties; it did not include informal discovery. Id. The study concluded:
[AIII the figures on discovery events per case are remarkably small, consid-
ering the widespread perception that federal civil discovery has gotten out
of hand and become "a rich man's tool." A maximum of 8.61 discovery
initiatives per completed case . . . hardly seems excessive, especially since
this is a total of initiatives by all parties. . . . [F]igures in the ranges
shown suggest that relatively little needless discovery is conducted in the
typical case. Of course it is quite possible that a large volume of needless
discovery is conducted in a small number of complex or protracted cases, a
possibility entirely consistent with these figures.
Id. at 27 (footnote omitted).
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Rules of Civil Procedure, moreover, do not set forth any time limit
within which discovery procedures must begin and end, leaving this
question to the individual courts and judges. In the "hope of assuring
that discovery is completed in what they consider a timely fashion, '5 3
a majority of district courts have adopted local rules prescribing al-
most automatic time limits on discovery.
One third of the federal districts calculate a time limit on discov-
ery from the occurrence of an event. Most of these, some nineteen
districts, use the joinder of issue-the filing of an answer-as the
moment at which discovery time begins to run. Eight of those dis-
tricts specify that all discovery is to be completed within three
months of joinder of issue."' Other courts place the cutoff time at
four months, 5 five months," and two at six months,67 from issue.
Some of these courts provide expressly for a longer time period for
certain complex cases, including patent, antitrust, and trademark
cases."
At least ten districts now provide for a "preliminary"6 or
"initial"7 pretrial conference to be held early in the litigation pro-
cess.' One of these districts, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
Yet, there is a perceived need to move discovery along so that cases are ready for
trial at an earlier date, and the study does indicate that some efforts on this behalf
produce results. The study founil that the interval between filing of the complaint and
the substantial completion of discovery varied from 182 days in the Southern District
of Florida, to 434 days in the District of Massachusetts; the average interval being
306.3 days. Id. at 26. This wide divergence indicates the utility of a survey of local
practices.
63. Id. at 25.
64. See, e.g., S.D. Miss. R. 11; W.D.N.C.R. 10; D.N.J. GEN. R. 15(A); D.N.D.R.
IV(F)(1); W.D. TEx. R. 26(e); CaSE MANAGEMENT STUDY, supra note 62, at 41 (New
Mexico District Court judge); SuRvEY, supra note 31 (Judge Stafford's standing order
in the Northern District of Florida).
65. N.D. GA. R. 181-11; S.D. GA. R. 7.1; D. KAN. R. 17(a); E.D.N.C. Civ. R. 7(E);
S.D. Tax. R. 15(e); N.D.W. VA. Civ. R. 2.08(b).
66. N.D. IND. R. 12(d); W.D. Mo. R. 20(D)(1); D. NEv. Civ. R. 17(A)(2)(a).
67. M.D. PA. R. 301.07; D.P.R.R. 7.
68. See, e.g., N.D. IND. R. 12(d); E.D.N.C. Civ. R. 7(E); S.D. Tax. R. 15(E);
W.D. Tax. R. 26(e). See also M.D.N.C. Cry. R. 22(h).
69. E.g., E.D. ILL. R. 9(b).
70. E.g., S.D. IND. R. 19(d).
71. In addition to the Eastern District of Illinois and Southern District of
Indiana, the following local rules provide for such pretrial conferences: N.D. & S.D.
IOWA Civ. R. 18(A)(1); D. MONT. R. 11(b); M.D.N.C. Civ. R. 22(a)-(d); D.N.H.R.
10(a); N.D. Oino Civ. R. 17;. E.D. PA. R. 7(b); E.D. VA. R. 12(3). This is also the
practice of Judges Boyle, Cassibry, Rubin, Schwartz, Sear, and West in the Eastern
District of Louisiana. SURvEY, supra note 31. Although the local rule for the District
of Maryland makes no such provision and the Survey did not uncover a general direc-
tive on the matter, the Federal Judicial Center study results show that all judges on
the District Court of Maryland have such a conference. See CASE MANAGEMENT STUDY,
supra note 62, at 21. In addition, some courts encourage counsel to meet at an early
discovery conference. See, e.g., W.D. TENN. R. 9(a).
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provides that this initial pretrial conference be held within 45 days
following the filing of the complaint.12 Two districts require that the
initial pretrial conference be held not more than sixty days after the
filing of the answer.73 The other seven districts provide for an initial
pretrial hearing, but no mandatory time for that conference is set
forth. In each instance, the principal purpose of the preliminary or
initial pretrial conference is to establish a schedule for discovery,
including a time for its completion. This pretrial conference culmi-
nates in a court order containing such a schedule. Some districts
follow a variation of this procedure. Without requiring a preliminary
pretrial conference, they provide that the court shall issue an order
setting a date by which all discovery is to be completed.
74
Another popular approach is to permit the continuation of dis-
covery until the occurrence of a particular event. In at least fourteen
districts, discovery may continue until the time of the pretrial confer-
ence.7 5 In two others, discovery may continue until the pretrial order
72. E.D. PA. R. 7(b).
73. N.D. & S.D. IOWA Civ. R. 18(A)(1); D.N.H.R. 10(a). The Districts of Iowa
have adopted a standard pretrial order to be issued by the clerk "forthwith" upon the
joining of issue, directing counsel to meet within sixty days of issue and to reach
agreement as to many specific items in an attached check list. One of those items is
an estimated date of completion of discovery. Within ten days after this preliminary
pretrial conference, counsel are to submit a report to the clerk setting forth its results.
Upon receipt of this report, the clerk issues a second standard pretrial order directing
the completion of discovery by a day certain.
74. See, e.g., N.D. Miss. Cxv. R. C-10(h). Other districts provide for an order to
be entered by the court or magistrate, or a letter of notification from the clerk, as to
when discovery is to be completed. See, e.g., D. NEB. R. 25(A)(4) (providing that as
soon as is practical after filing of a civil suit, the court "with or without consultation
with counsel" may issue such an order); D. NEv. Civ. R. 17(A); D.N.H.R. 10(a).
The "Rules of Practice" of Judge Mahon of the Northern District of Texas provide
that, within "about 10 days" after issue has been joined, the court will enter an order
setting a date for the completion of discovery. The Rules set forth that "in the normal
case" that date will be "approximately six months" after issue is joined. That order
will also set a date for a final pretrial conference and for trial, which "in the normal
case" will be eight months after issue. See SuRvEY, supra note 31.
75. See E.D. & W.D. ARK. R. 9(e); C.D. CAL. R. 9(c); S.D. CAL. R. 9(d); D. CONN.
R. 11(a); D. DEL. R. 11(A); D. IDAHO R. 10(c); W.D. LA. R. 23(h)(3); D. ME. R. 21; D.
MD. Supp. R. 35(b); E.D. OKLA. R. 17(b); N.D. OKLA. R. 17(b); W.D. OKLA. R. 16(b);
E.D. TEN. R. 9(c).
Eastern District of California Rule 103(b) is a slight variation on this theme:
Any party who is ready to proceed to pre-trial conference and trial may serve
and file a motion to have the case set for pre-trial conference or for trial, or
both. Said motion shall be accompanied by a Certificate of Readiness stating
that:
(2) The party has completed all desired depositions, other discovery and
pre-trial motions, except specified discovery or motions, if any, which could
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is entered,"6 although ordinarily that will occur on the day of the
pretrial conference. A variation on this theme is found in the Western
District of Pennsylvania. There, in all cases involving personal inju-
ries, pretrial is "invoked" by a written notice from a judge or from a
clerk of the court. All discovery is to be completed within fifty days
"after pretrial has been invoked."77 The Southern District of Florida
provides that discovery is to be completed no later than five days
prior to the date of the pretrial conference.7 8 The Middle District of
Florida provides for the completion of discovery before counsel are to
meet to confer regarding pretrial, which is ordinarily ten days before
the pretrial conference. Finally, in some districts providing for ter-
mination of discovery prior to pretrial, the pretrial conference is set
automatically. For example, the Central District of California pro-
vides that the pretrial shall be scheduled approximately sixty days
after joinder of issue,80 and that all discovery shall be completed prior
to the pretrial conference. 8'
One might assume that the existence of a rule or court policy
requiring early preliminary conferences or setting deadlines for dis-
covery would be enough to ensure that discovery is concluded in a
timely fashion. This assumption is, however, open to question. The
median time for the completion of discovery in the Southern District
of Florida, for example, which does not require a preliminary pretrial
conference" and which permits discovery to continue until five days
before final pretrial,3 is only 182 days. 4 In contrast, the median time
for the completion of discovery in the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania, which requires a preliminary pretrial conference to be held
within 45 days of the filing of the complaint, 5 is 305 days.86 The
not have been completed in the exercise of due diligence.
E.D. CAL. Civ. R. 103(b).
76. See D.D.C. Cw. R. 1-15(d); SuRvEY, supra note 31 (District of Vermont).
77. W.D. PA. R. 5(l1)(C)(1). The rule applies explicitly to "civil cases involving
personal injuries . . . ." While Rule 5(ll)(A) provides that there will be pretrial "on
every civil case," unless a court otherwise orders, the point at which discovery is to
terminate in civil cases not involving personal injury is not clear from the local rules.
78. S.D. FLA. GEN. R. 14(F).
79. M.D. FLA. GEN. R. 3.05(b), 3.06(b). Rule 3.06(b) provides that in some cases
counsel may be ordered to meet to prepare a pretrial stipulation without a pretrial
conference.
80. C.D. CAL. R. 9(a).
81. C.D. CAL. R. 9(b)(3).
82. S.D. FLA. GEN. R. 14(F).
83. Id.
84. See CASE MANAGEMENT STUDY, supra note 62, at 26, Table 11 (considering 96
cases).
85. E.D. PA. R. 7(b).




longest median time for completion of discovery, 434 days, is found
in the District of Massachusetts,"7 which permits discovery to con-
tinue for up to two years after issue is joinedM1 The wide range of
median discovery time strongly suggests that it is exercise of court
control over discovery, rather than the existence of a court rule, that
determines the length of discovery. 9
One cannot say, of course, that a prolonged discovery period is
bad. Those cases that are ordinarily thought of as com-
plex-antitrust, securities fraud, stockholders' derivative, patents,
products liability-may require longer discovery periods. Even in
simpler cases, there are circumstances that make exceptional treat-
ment appropriate.'" To retain the necessary flexibility, courts have
87. See id. (considering 154 cases).
88. The District of Massachusetts has no local rule or standing order of the
district governing this point. Operating on an individual calendar basis, each judge
follows his own procedure. At least three of the six active judges send out pretrial orders
specifying that all discovery is to be completed within six months after issue is joined.
But because the district has a tremendous backlog of cases-caused by a series of long-
term vacancies in the past decade plus the tremendous time that Judge Garrity has
had to put in on the Boston School case and a few other big cases-for most of the
judges, civil trials are long delayed. For this reason, extensions and continuances of
discovery completion deadlines are liberally granted by at least three of the judges.
For one, discovery completion two years after issue has been joined is now considered
typical. See SuavEY, supra note 31.
89. It is of interest to note the method of control exercised by the Southern
District of Florida, which enjoyed the shortest period for discovery of any district
studied by the Federal Judicial Center. See text accompanying notes 82-83 supra. At
a median time of 18 days after answer, a notice is sent out to counsel scheduling a
pretrial conference in preparation for trial. See CASE MANAGEMENT STUDY, supra note
62, at 20, 35, Table 21 (considering 250 cases). This conference is often set some 30 to
45 days later and rarely more than 90 days later. Id. at 20. As noted earlier, note 78
supra and accompanying text, discovery in Southern Florida is to terminate five days
before pretrial. S.D. FLA. GEN. R. 14(F). This appears to be effective for at approxi-
mately the time that the pretrial conference is set, the trial date is also set. See CASE
MANAGEMENT STUDY, supra note 62, at 34, Table 20. And the Southern District of
Florida grants few continuances. See id. at 36.
In contrast, the Central District of California, which similarly sets an early final
pretrial conference and requires that discovery be completed by the time of the confer-
ence, sets the trial date at the time of the pretrial conference. See id. at 34. The district
is also very liberal with continuances. See id. at 36-37. The result appears to be
reflected in the contrast in median time for disposition of all civil cases, whether tried
or not-seven months in Central California and four months in Southern Florida, id.
at 2, Table 1-and in the median time to go to trial-476 days in Central California
and 254 days in Southern Florida. Id. at 34, Table 20.
90. The Fourth Circuit has emphasized the need for latitude in establishing and
maintaining timetables for the discovery process:
A set rule limiting the time within which pretrial discovery may be had may
be appropriate for routine cases, indeed, for most cases. The exceptional case
requires different treatment, however, and the spirit of the rules does not
require that completeness in the exposure of the issues in the pretrial discov-
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been given the power to terminate discovery at an earlier date than
that provided for in the local rule" or to extend that time. The local
rules often provide for such an extension "for good cause shown," 2
"to prevent manifest injustice," 3 or "for valid cause shown to exist
beyond the control of litigants or counsel."" One court states that
additional time will be allowed only "[iln the exceptionally difficult
case."" Another insists that for an extension there must be "a factual
showing that the moving party has diligently pursued discovery dur-
ing the period originally specified."" Some courts, while not provid-
ing explicitly for the power to extend the time for discovery, permit
a trial judge to exercise a broad, general authority in a specific case
to modify the application of any local rule "to meet emergencies or
to avoid injustice or great hardship."" While many of the court rules
contain no explicit statement that the courts retain the power to
extend the time for discovery beyond that provided by the local rule,
there can be no doubt of the inherent power to do so.18
In practice, many judges refuse to adhere blindly to discovery
limitations imposed by court rules, preferring to focus upon the pecu-
liar requirements of each case and varying their approach accord-
ingly; close supervision and control, and hence individual treatment,
is exercised through conferences with counsel, status calls, and mo-
tion hearings." The practice of a judge of the District of Columbia-
where the order and pretrial are set by the judge and the discovery
cutoff is at the time of pretrial-is illustrative: he examines all of his
civil cases in detail every three or four months, singling out those in
which he finds counsel may be delinquent, and setting those cases
ery proceedings be sacrificed to speed in reaching the ultimate trial on the
merits. Delay should be avoided to the extent that it is unnecessary or
unreasonable but adequate time must be allowed for discovery of the facts
and assembly of the proof.
Freehill v. Lewis, 355 F.2d 46, 48 (4th Cir. 1966).
91. Some courts expressly recognize this power. See, e.g., M.D. FLA. GEN. R.
3.05(a).
92. S.D. FLA. GEN. R. 14(F).
93. E.D. & W.D. ARK. R. 9(e).
94. N.D. & S.D. IowA Ctv. R. 18(B)(2). This rule adds that for such an extension
the case must require an "extraordinary pre-trial record." Id.
95. W.D.N.C. GEN. R. 10.
96. S.D. IND. GEN. R. 19(g).
97. D. KAN. R. 3; see D. ME. R. 1(c); D.N.M.R. 34.
98. Indeed, some appellate courts have read local rule time requirements as
providing only a guideline for a case-by-case approach, holding that the rule is not
dispositive in itself, but dependent upon final determination by the trial judge on each
case's peculiar facts. See Bardin v. Mondon, 298 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1961); Sykes v.
United States, 290 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1961); Hayden v. Chalfant Press, Inc., 281 F.2d
543 (9th Cir. 1960); Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Nebraska Storage Ware-
houses, 96 F.2d 30 (8th Cir. 1938).
99. See SuRVEy, supra note 31 (Judge Matsch of the District Court of Colorado),
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for a status call. At that meeting, he ascertains the additional time
that each side reasonably needs to complete discovery in light of the
particular case, and he orders discovery to terminate on a day cer-
tain."
The three major proposals now before the bar also address the
problem of prolonged discovery. Both the Advisory Committee and
the ABA Committee propose an amendment to the Federal Rules to
make it mandatory for a district court, upon the request of any party,
to hold a preliminary pretrial "discovery conference."''1° When a re-
quest is made for a discovery conference, counsel is to submit a state-
ment of the issues as they appear at that time, a plan and schedule
of discovery, and limitations upon discovery that counsel then be-
lieves to be necessary or appropriate. 2 Opposing counsel would have
ten days to make additions and objections,' and the conference
would follow. The ABA Committee urges that this conference be
presided over by the trial judge "so that he participates in the early
definition of issues."'' The discovery conference is to terminate in
an order identifying the issues, establishing a plan and schedule of
discovery, setting limitations on discovery, and determining other
pertinent matters. 5 Significantly, the proposed new Rule requires
that the party requesting the discovery conference must also furnish
the court with a statement that he "has made a reasonable effort to
reach agreement with opposing attorneys on the matter set forth in
the request."' The Advisory Committee has stated that "it is not
contemplated that requests for discovery conferences will be made
100. Id. (notes accompanying questionnaire of Judge George L. Hart, Jr., of
the District Court of the District of Columbia).
101. See ABA COMMITTEE, supra note 27, at 4-7 (proposed Rule 26(c)); 1979
REvosED DRAFt, supra note 26, at 3-4 (Advisory Committee proposed Rule 26(f)). The
Advisory Committee also makes explicit the present inherent power of a court to call
such a conference without a request by counsel.
102. See sources cited at note 101 supra.
103. See id.
104. ABA CommrrrsE, supra note 27, at 5-7 (Comments to proposed Rule 26(c)).
105. See 1979 REVIsED DRAt, supra note 26, at 3-4 (Advisory Committee pro-
posed Rule 26(f)); ABA Comonrs, supra note 27, at 4 (proposed Rule 26(c)). The
ABA Committee Comments to its proposed new Rule 26(c) are quite specific on the
contemplated contents regarding discovery:
The conference will produce an order defining: (a) a "plan" in which the
types and subjects of discovery are set forth, e.g., oral depositions of A, B
and C; production of contracts and any letters, correspondence or memo-
randa explaining or modifying them, etc.; (b) a "schedule" for discovery
which specifies the time and place for discovery events, e.g., the dates and
places for the taking of depositions of A, B and C, or the time within which
documents are to be produced; and (c) such "limitations" as might otherwise
be employed in protective orders, e.g., the documents of C shall be disclosed
only to B's lawyers.
Id. at 6.




routinely," but that the matter will ordinarily be resolved by counsel
conferring with each other.'"' The ABA Committee agrees that the
discovery conference with the court should "be the exception rather
than the rule"; in the "great majority of the cases" agreement is
expected to be reached by counsel without judicial intervention.,,,
The Survey indicates that a procedure similar to that proposed
by the Advisory Committee and the ABA Committee has been in
effect in at least ten districts.'09 In those districts, the conference is
mandatory in every civil case. The rules concerning the purpose of the
conference are often more general than the provisions of the proposed
new Federal Rule. But that is not always the case. In the Northern
and Southern Districts of Iowa, for example, the rule is supplemented
by a detailed form order and check list automatically sent out by the
court.""0
As previously suggested, however,"' having a rule on the books
is not an answer in itself. There must be an intent on the part of the
judge to manage a case (either personally or through a magistrate)
in order to bring about as speedy, efficient, and inexpensive comple-
tion of discovery as possible. When there is such interest, a rule is
unnecessary; where there is no such interest, a rule is no help. Where
the district judges have felt that the requirement of a discovery con-
ference would be helpful, they have already so provided by local rule
or by standing orders or general practices of individual judges.
IV. PREVENTING DISCOVERY ABUSE AND BRINGING
MORE EFFICIENCY TO DISCOVERY DEVICES
The line between proper, even properly aggressive, use of discov-
ery and its abuse is difficult to draw. "Perhaps [abuse of discovery]
is like pornography-it is very easy to recognize, but it is awfully hard
to define.""' 2 Yet, certain problems with the use of discovery have
been identified and solutions have been proferred. Some concern per-
ceived abuse of the process. Others involve situations in which the
process is seen to be less efficient, or more expensive, than it might
be.
This section of the Article examines the local rules of various
district courts and the directives, standing orders, and practices of
individual judges for their solutions to these problems. First, the
107. See id. at 5 (Advisory Committee Note to proposed Rule 26(0).
108. See ABA COMMITTEME, supra note 27, at 4 (Comments to proposed Rule
26(c)).
109. See note 71 supra.
110. See note 73 supra.
111. See text at notes 82-89 supra.
112. Meeting of the Metropolitan Chief Judges Conference (Apr. 19, 1976) (tran-
script) (comment of unidentified judge).
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general scope of discovery is discussed, each of the discovery devices
is examined individually, and the courts' filing requirements are
studied. Second, comparison is made with the major proposals for
Federal Rule changes now before the bar.
A. SCOPE OF DiscovERY
The scope of permissible discovery is now set forth in Federal
Rule 26(b)(1) as "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action . "... 11,3 This Rule has
been criticized because "sweeping and abusive discovery is encour-
aged by permitting discovery confined only by the 'subject matter'
of a case . . rather than limiting it to the 'issues' presented."", The
Supreme Court has, in addition, done little to restrict the reach of
Federal Rule 26(b)(1):
The key phrase in this definition-"relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action"-has been construed broadly to
encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead
to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in
the case. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).["' ] Con-
sistently with the notice-pleading system established by the Rules,
discovery is not limited to issues raised by the pleadings, for discov-
ery itself is designed to help define and clarify the issues. Hickman
v. Taylor, supra, at 500-501. Nor is discovery limited to the merits
of a case, for a variety of fact-oriented issues may arise during litiga-
tion that are not related to the merits."6
Since the local rules adopted by the district courts may not be
inconsistent with the Federal Rules,1 7 it is not surprising that there
113. FED. R. Civ. R. 26(b)(1).
114. ABA COMMITTEE, supra note 27, at 2-3 (Comments to proposed Rule
26(b)(1)). The Committee Comments go on to explain: "For example, the present
Rule may allow inquiry into the practices of an entire business or industry upon the
ground that the business or industry is the 'subject matter' of an action, even though
only specified industry practices raise the 'issues' in the case." Id. at 3.
115. In a footnote, the Court quoted Professor Moore's treatise on Federal Prac-
tice: "[Tihe court should and ordinarily does interpret 'relevant' very broadly to
mean matter that is relevant to anything that is or may become an issue in the
litigation." Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 98 S. Ct. 2380, 2389 n.12 (1978),
quoting 4 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.56[l], at 26-131 n.34 (2d ed. 1976).
116. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 98 S. Ct. 2380, 2389-90 (1978) (footnote
omitted).
117. Federal Rule 83 allows district courts to "make and amend rules governing
its practice not inconsistent with these rules." FED. R. Civ. P. 83 (emphasis added). A
commentator has noted:
The intention of the Committee was to provide a simple, unified system
which would be governed by a single, brief body of rules. The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure do not, however, cover all situations. To the extent that
the new rules, together with the federal statutes, do not regulate the practice
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are no local rules reducing the scope of permissible discovery. Yet,
whenever a challenge to relevancy of inquiry is made, a parameter
must be drawn. And as pleadings come in, as facts are stipulated or
otherwise admitted, as discovery progresses, it becomes possible to
define to a greater extent the issues that are or may be in the case.
Experience with this limiting process has occurred in complex
litigation. The Manual for Complex Litigation has been promul-
gated,"' setting forth certain procedures as guidelines to be followed
in complex litigation."' The Manual contains a suggestion for a series
of pretrial conferences,2 0 and a recommendation that at the second
conference an attempt be made to establish "limits" on the "subject
matter for the remaining discovery on the merits" in order "to keep
discovery within the bounds of reason and relevancy .... ,,,1,
Picking up on this theme, the North District of Ohio has estab-
lished a procedure for limiting issues for discovery in complex cases.
That court has promulgated rules for complex litigation as a part of
its local rules,' and has provided that in these cases discovery is to
be "confined to the genuine issues necessary to a decision of the
case."'2 Within 180 days after issue is joined, counsel is to submit
tentative statements "explaining and clarifying the positions taken
in the pleadings. ' ' ' 2' A pretrial conference is to follow for the purpose
and procedure, the district courts are permitted to formulate their own rules.
Hopkinson, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Compared with the Former
Federal Equity Rules and the Wisconsin Code, 23 MARQ. L. REV. 159, 160 (1939). See
generally note 29 supra.
118. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (rev. ed. 1977 & Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL]. The Manual
which is continually revised, is published as 1 Pt. 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE (1978)
and as a supplementary pamphlet to C. WuIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE (1977 & Supp. 1978).
119. "Complex litigation" is defined as "one or two or more related cases which
present unusual problems and which require extraordinary treatment, including but
not limited to the cases designated as 'protracted' and 'big.'" MANUAL, supra note 118
at § 0.10.
120. Id. at § 0.40.
121. Id. at § 2.40.
122. The rules apply to any case that
(a) arises under any of the antitrust laws of the United States;
(b) involves a prayer for recovery of $1,000,000 or more;
(c) involves a request for injunctive relief affecting the operations of a major
business entity;
(d) involves a large number of parties of an association of large membership;
(e) is patent case involving an unusual multiplicity or complexity of issues;
or
(f) may otherwise be a protracted case.
N.D. OHIO COMPLEX LITIGATION R. 1.




of "defining the bounds of discovery in accordance with the elabora-
tion and clarification of the issues as a result of the pretrial confer-
ences."' 5 The rule specifically provides that a party is not precluded
"from changing his position or amending his pleading, where other-
wise proper," but the statement of issues nevertheless serves "as a
framework for discovery.' '2
6
The preliminary pretrial conferences, which a number of dis-
tricts now require soon after the filing of the complaint or answer,'2
also provide a vehicle for preliminary issue definition. Some local
rules now require that at the preliminary pretrial, and in statements
prepared prior to the actual conference, counsel address what then
appear to be the issues in the case.12 While it is not clear, from
information uncovered in the Survey, that judges (or magistrates)
actually use this opportunity to define and limit the concept of rele-
vancy for discovery purposes, the potential is clearly present.
The ABA Committee proposes that Federal Rule 26(b)(1) be
amended to limit the scope of discovery to "any matter, not privi-
leged, which is relevant to the issues raised by the claims or defenses
of any party. 126 The ABA Committee, while recognizing that
"[d]etermining when discovery spills beyond 'issues' and into
'subject matter' will not always be easy, recommends the change if
only to direct courts not to continue the present practice of erring on
the side of expansive discovery.""13
The Advisory Committee in 1978 rejected the ABA Committee's
suggestion of the use of the term "issues" in place of "subject matter
of the action" in Federal Rule 26(b)(1):
The [Advisory] Committee doubts that replacing one very
general term with another equally general one will prevent abuse
occasioned by the generality of language. Further, it fears that the
introduction of a new term in the place of a familiar one will invite
unnecessary litigation over the significance of the change.' 3'
The Advisory Committee proposed that Federal Rule 26(b)(1) be
amended so as to eliminate the "subject matter involved in the pend-
125. N.D. Omo COMPLEX LMGATION R. 4(b).
126. Id.
127. See note 71 supra.
128. See, e.g., N.D. & S.D. IOWA Civ. R. (18)(A)(1) (as supplemented by stan-
dard pretrial orders and clerk's checklist, automatically sent to counsel); D. MONT. R.
11(c)(2); E.D. PA. R. 7(c). The Northern and Southern Districts of Iowa and the
District of Montana place rather elaborate requirements on counsel.
129. ABA COMmTrEE, supra note 27, at 2.
130. Id., at 3 (Committee Comments to proposed amended Rule 26(b)(1)).




ing action"'' language of the current Rule, and that it be made to
read: "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the claim or
defense" of any party1E3
After receiving comments on its 1978 proposal, the Advisory
Committee receded completely from even this modest change. Its
1979 proposal, presently before the bar, includes no change in
Federal Rule 26(b). 131
Both Committees recommend that the discovery conference,
which a party may have as of right upon request, focus on the scope
of discovery. The Advisory Committee recommendation is that the
request for the discovery conference include a "statement of the is-
sues as they then appear," and that the court order, following the
conference, "tentatively identifly] the issues for discovery pur-
poses," subject to amendment "whenever justice so requires."',,
It appears that the mechanism to accomplish this end is now
present in the local rules of several of the districts. These rules pro-
vide for an early conference between court and counsel for the pur-
pose of planning discovery. As noted,' several districts specifically
require attention to matters involved in defining relevancy for discov-
ery purposes. Moreover, the Northern District of Ohio now provides
expressly for issue definition for discovery purposes. 3 The difficulty
comes in defining the concept of relevancy so as to avoid erring "on
the side of expansive discovery." This task is not made any easier by
the Supreme Court's recent dicta on the subject.13 Even overcoming
that difficulty, success will depend upon a federal judge who actively
takes charge of a case at its very beginning and assists cooperative
counsel in drawing reasonable lines of relevancy for discovery pur-
132. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
133. 1978 PROPOSED DRAFT, supra note 26, at 623. The Advisory Committee
explained: "If the term 'subject matter' does in fact persuade courts to err 'on the
side of expansive discovery,' it should be eliminated, and that is the course recom-
mended by the Committee." Id. at 627-28.
134. 1979 REVISED DRAFT, supra note 26, at 1.
135. Id. at 3-4 (Advisory Committee proposed Rule 26(f)). The ABA Com-
mittee recommendation is somewhat different. That Committee recommended that-
the request for a discovery conference include "a statement of the issues to be tried,"
and that the court "shall enter an order fixing the issues," subject, of course, to
amendment "[ulpon a showing of good cause. . . ." ABA CoMMrrES supra note 27,
at 4 (emphasis added) (proposed new Rule 26(c)). The difference in approach is that
the ABA Committee appears to propose that the initial discovery conference fix the
issues for trial, subject to amendment for "good cause." The Advisory Committee, on
the other hand, proposes only that the issues be set for discovery purposes at the initial
conference, leaving issue identification for trial to the final pretrial conference, as is
the case now.
136. See note 128 supra and accompanying text.
137. See text accompanying notes 122-26 supra.
138. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 98 S. Ct. 2380, 2389 (1978), quoted at
text accompanying note 116 supra.
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poses. No rule, local or federal, can ensure this essential element.
But a rule may help to set a tone for both bar and bench to follow.
B. USE OF DISCOVERY DEVICES
Several of the discovery devices have come under fire as being
easily subject to abuse. Suggestions have also been made that these
devices can be rendered more efficient and economical to use. Again,
the district judges have been experimenting.
1. Interrogatories
The use of interrogatories, authorized by Rule 33, has received a
great deal of attention. The Field Survey of Federal Pretrial Dis-
covery, conducted by the Project for Effective Justice of Columbia
University Law School a decade and a half ago, found that interro-
gatories were thought of by attorneys as the discovery device most
conducive to friction between parties. '39 The Advisory Committee
and the ABA Committee have noted the existence of discovery
abuse attributable to the use of Rule 33 interrogatories.10
Many district courts have responded to this situation with local
requirements. One district judge, for example, has let it be known
that the "use of interrogatories is not allowed until other means have
been exhausted, and then only upon good cause shown to the
Court." ' Another has limited the scope of interrogatories.' Several
139. Rosenberg, supra note 18, at 490; see FIELD SURVEY, supra note 9.
140. The Advisory Committee reported that "[t]here is general agreement that
interrogatories spawn a greater percentage of objections and motions than any other
discovery device." FED. R. Cirv. P. 33, Notes of Advisory Committee on 1970 Amend-
ment, 28 U.S.C. app. 455 (1976). In 1977, the ABA Committee stated that "[n]o single
rule was perceived by the Bar at large. . . as engendering more discovery abuse than
Rule 33 on interrogatories." ABA Commrrraa, supra note 27, at 20 (Comments to
proposed Rule 33).
141. SuRvav, supra note 31 (response of Ralph A. Cosenza, Minute Clerk, regard-
ing the practice of Judge Pollack of the Southern District of New York).
These local rules limiting the scope and use of interrogatories seem to be inconsist-
ent with the express language of Rule 26(a). Rule 26(a) instructs that
[p]arties may obtain discovery by one or more of the following methods:
depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written interrogato-
ries; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or
other property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental ex-
aminations; and requests for admission. Unless the court orders otherwise
under subdivision (c) of this rule, the frequency of use of these methods is
not limited.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (emphasis added). See also note 117 supra.
142. A standard order of Judge Williams of the Northern District of California
states that
[ijnterrogatories shall be specifically directed to (1) securing the names,
location and probable testimony of witnesses, (2) the existence, location and
general description of relevant documents and other physical evidence, and
(3) information concerning the transaction(s) upon which the claims for
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district courts have enacted maximum limits on the number of inter-
rogatories that may be filed without special court permission."' For
example, the Middle District of Florida restricts the number that
may be served by any party upon any other party "at one time or
cumulatively" to no "more than fifty interrogatories. . . including
all parts and subparts." '' The Northern District of Illinois limits the
number to twenty, but counts as a single interrogatory one with sub-
parts that "relate directly to the subject matter of the interroga-
tory."I" A few judges limit a party to twenty interrogatories including
all subparts.1" All of these courts and judges permit additional inter-
rogatories on motion for good cause shown. As Rtile 33 provides no
limitation in number, the validity of such local rules is question-
able.
Several districts also "prohibit the filing of mimeographed or
otherwise duplicated forms of 'stock' interrogatories except where the
nature of the case or the number of the parties makes the use of such
forms necessary and feasible." 47 On the other hand, a few districts
allow the use of court-approved uniform interrogatories,'8 to be "used
only if it is appropriate in the particular case.""' The efficiency ef-
fected is that "[n]o objection to the form or substance" may be
relief are based. Broadly generalized, boilerplate interrogatories will not be
permitted.
SURVEY, supra note 31.
143. See, e.g., M.D. FLA. GEN. R. 3.03(a); N.D. ILL. GEN. R. 9(2); SURVEY, supra
note 31 (standard order of Judge Turrentine of the Southern District of California;
standard instruction of Judge Owens of the Middle District of Georgia; standard order
of Judge McMillan of the Western District of North Carolina; practice of Judge Burns
of the District of Oregon, as indicated by the response of Robert M. Christ, Clerk;
standing order of Judge Cahn of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; standard letter
instructions of Judge Teitelbaum of the Western District of Pennsylvania).
144. M.D. FLA. GEN. R. 3.03(a).
145. N.D. ILL. GEN. R. 9(g). Other districts also follow this practice. See SURVEY,
supra note 31 (standard order of Judge Turrentine of the Southern District of Califor-
nia; practice of Judge Burns of the District of Oregon, according to the response of
Robert M. Christ, Clerk; standing order of Judge Cahn of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania).
146. See SURVEY, supra note 31 (standard instructions of Judge Owens of the
Middle District of Georgia; standard order of Judge McMillan of the Western District
of North Carolina; standard letter instructions of Judge Teitelbaum of the Western
District of Pennsylvania).
147. E.D. ILL. R. 10(b); N.D. IND. R. 8(b). Judge Owens of the Middle District
of Georgia, who limits parties to twenty interrogatories-counting parts and sub-
parts-has instructed counsel: "Form, canned interrogatories in excess of twenty are
not usually approved." See SURVEY, supra note 31. See also E.D. VA. R. 11(D) (prohib-
iting such interrogatories unless the attorney has deleted all extraneous matter and
certifies that he has read the remaining portions and has a good faith belief that the
contents are pertinent to the case).
148. See, e.g., D. ARiz. Civ. R. 37(b)(1); W.D. Mo. R. 20(D)(4); E.D. PA. R.
(Interrogatories Approved for Asking in Appropriate Cases)(addendum to local rules
under letter of Dec. 7, 1956).
149. D. ARiz. Civ. R. 37(b)(2).
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made concerning the approved interrogatory'55 unless it is "not within
the scope of permissible discovery in the particular action."",
Efficiency would dictate that each interrogatory propounded and
the answer or objection thereto be typed (or otherwise produced) in
close proximity to each other. This is required by a great number of
districts. But they differ on where they place the burden of conform-
ity. Many insist that the party propounding the interrogatory leave
a space immediately following the interrogatory, and that that space
be sufficient in size for the answer or objection.' Others require that
the party to whom the interrogatories have been propounded quote
the interrogatory immediately before each answer or objection.'5 3 A
few place the initial burden on the interrogator but then tell the
answerer that, if the space left is insufficient, the answerer must
quote the interrogatory immediately prior to each answer or objec-
tion.154
Another problem concerns a practice of using an objection to a
part of an interrogatory as an excuse for not answering the remaining
portion. A few courts have addressed this problem by providing that,
if an objection is made to a part of an interrogatory, the respondent
shall answer that part to which there is no objection.' 5  One court
requires the respondent in such a situation to certify that he has
answered all parts of the interrogatory that he does not consider
objectionable.' 6
Although neither Federal Rule 33 nor Federal Rule 37 imposes a
time limit on the use of a motion to compel an answer to an interroga-
tory, several districts have attempted to prevent delays in answering
interrogatories by imposing such time limits.The Southern District
of California, for example, has provided that a motion to compel an
150. W.D..Mo. R. 20(D)(4).
151. D. ARIZ. Civ. R. 37(b)(2). Another efficiency mechanism exists in the Dis-
trict of Arizona, where the rules provide that the interrogator need not file approved
interrogatories with the court at the time of service, but instead need file only a notice
of the identifying numbers of the approved interrogatories that were served. D. ARIz.
Civ. R. 37(b)(3); see text accompanying note 234 infra (discussion of filing require-
ments).
152. See, e.g., D. ARIz. Civ. R. 37(a)(2); M.D. FLA. R. 3.03(b); N.D. IND. R. 8(a);
N.D. & S.D. IOWA Civ. R. 17(c); D. KAN. R. 17(d); D.N.H.R. 14(a)(1); D.N.J. GEM. R.
16; N.D. OHIO Civ. R. 3(d); W.D. PA. R. 4(b); W.D. WASH. Civ. R. CR33(d)(1).
153. See, e.g., D. ALASKA GEN. R. 8(D); E.D. & W.D. ARK. R. 10; E.D. CAL. GEN.
R. 6(b); N.D. CAL. Civ. R. 230(1); S.D. CAL. R. 6(c); D. CONN. R. 21; D. DEL. R. 19;
D.D.C. Civ. R. 1-9(A); E.D. ILL. R. 10(a); N.D. ILL. GEM. R. 9(c); S.D. IND. R. 12(a);
E.D. LA. R. 3.12; D. ME. R. 16(a); D. MASS. R. 15(a)(2); N.D. Miss. CIv. R. C-5; D.
MONT. R. 8(e); D.N.D.R. IV(F)(4); N.D. OKLA. R. 10(c); W.D. OKLA. R. 9(c); E.D. PA.
R. 25(a); D.R.I.R. 13(a); W.D. TENN. R. 9(f).
154. See, e.g., D. ARIZ. Civ. R. 37(a)(4).
155. S.D. CAL. R. 6(c); D. MASS. R. 15(c); E.D. MICH. R. XIV; W.D. PA. R. 4(c);
D.R.I.R. 13(c).
156. E.D. MICH. R. XIV.
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answer to an interrogatory is waived if not filed within fifteen days
after service of the answer or objection."7 The District of Massachu-
setts, in addition, provides that, if the court grants a motion to com-
pel an answer, the answer shall be filed within fifteen days of the
order, unless the court otherwise directs.'5 ' On the other hand, the
Massachusetts District also provides a method for an automatic ex-
tension of twenty days for the thirty-day time period to answer inter-
rogatories. The propounder of interrogatories not answered in time
must apply to the clerk of the court for a Notice of Delinquency,
which the clerk is to send to the respondent. No motion to compel
answer or sanction may be filed for twenty days thereafter.'59
Three districts have local rules concerning the duty to supple-
ment answers given to interrogatories. The District of Delaware pro-
vides that "[a]ll interrogatories and answers thereto shall be deemed
to be continuing, unless otherwise ordered by the Court."'" In the
District of Massachusetts, if a response to an interrogatory is com-
plete when made, there is no duty to supplement it without a court
order."' The District of New Hampshire provides that there is a duty
to supplement only an interrogatory that seeks information concern-
ing the identification of persons with knowledge of relevant facts. 2
All three local rules appear to be more restrictive than the federal
rule,"' and therefore appear to be of doubtful validity."'
Both the ABA Committee and the Advisory Committee have
proposed amendments to Federal Rule 33 involving interrogatories.
The ABA Committee suggests that Rule 33(a) be amended to limit
to thirty the number of interrogatories that one party may serve on
another party without a court order "to be granted upon a showing
of necessity. . . ." " The Committee has commented that, while it
had considered numerous solutions to the problems with interrogato-
ries, it had "determined that an initial numerical limitation on inter-
rogatories filed as a matter of right was the soundest approach to
limiting interrogatory abuse and to enhancing better use of interroga-
tories as a discovery mechanism.""' The ABA Committee proposal
includes a provision that "[e]ach interrogatory shall consist of a
single question.""' 7 The Committee would make an exception, how-
157. S.D. CAL. R. 3(c)(9).
158. D. MASS. R. 15(c).
159. D. MASS. R. 15(g).
160. D. DEL. R. 19.
161. D. MASS. R. 13.
162. D.N.H.R. 14(e).
163. See FED. R. Crw. P. 26(e).
164. See notes 29, 117 supra and accompanying text.
165. ABA CoMInTrEE, supra note 27, at 18.
166. Id. at 20 (Comments to proposed Rule 33).
167. Id. at 18 (proposed Rule 33(a)).
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ever: "[I]nterrogatories inquiring as to the names and locations of
witnesses or the existence, location and custodians of documents or
physical evidence [should] each be construed as one interrogatory.
Greater leniency is recommended in these areas because they are well
suited to non-abusive exploration by interrogatory."''6 8
The Advisory Committee has rejected the ABA suggestions. At
first, it would have amended Rule 33(a) to permit each district
court, by the action of a majority .of its judges, to limit the number
of interrogatories that may be used by a party. The Advisory Com-
mittee noted that some districts now impose limitations on the num-
ber of interrogatories that may be served without court permission."9
It stated that other districts might be deterred from imposing such
limits by Federal Rule 26(a), which makes the validity of such local
rules doubtful at the present time.'70 By specifically authorizing a
local rule in this regard, the Advisory Committee proposal, if
adopted, would have removed possible objections to the local rules.
The Advisory Committee, however, has now dropped this pro-
posal. In its 1979 Revised Preliminary Draft, there is no authorization
for district courts to limit the number of interrogatories,'7' thus re-
taining the present system.
The proposed revisions of Federal Rule 33 have also addressed a
problem that has apparently received no attention in any local dis-
trict court rule or procedure. Under Federal Rule 33, a party respond-
ing to an interrogatory in lieu of answering, may make available to
the proponent business materials from which the answer may be
derived. Although the Advisory Committee has stated that "[a] re-
spondent may not impose on an interrogating party a mass of records
as to which research is feasible only for one familiar with the rec-
ords,"'' some parties have used the business records option to force
upon the interrogating party a great mass of unorganized documents,
sometimes "all of their records." ' To alleviate this problem, both
168. Id. at 20 (Comments to proposed Rule 33).
169. 1978 PRoposFD DRAFT, supra note 26, at 649 (Advisory Committee Note to
proposed amended Rule 33); see note 143 supra.
170. FED. R. Civ. R. 26(a) states, "Unless the court orders otherwise under sub-
division (c) of this rule [dealing with protective orders], the frequency of use of these
[discovery] methods is not limited."
171. See 1979 RvisFD DRAFT, supra note 26, at 13-14.
172. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(c), Notes of Advisory Committee on 1970 Amendment,
28 U.S.C. app. 457 (1976).
173. 1979 REvISED DRAFT, supra note 26, at 14 (Comment to proposed Rule
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the Advisory Committee and the ABA Committee propose adding to
Federal Rule 33(c) a requirement that the responding party, when
turning over the records from which the interrogating party is to
ascertain the answer, not only is to "specify the records from which
the answer may be derived," but also include "sufficient detail as
to permit the interrogating party to locate and to identify as readily
as can the party served the records from which the answer may be
ascertained."'74 The ABA Committee notes that, as a part of the
answers to interrogatories, the specification is to be under oath.,"
While this change will do no harm and may do some good, two
comments are warranted. If the matter addressed has been a problem
of general application, it seems strange that no district court has
adopted a local rule on the point and that the Survey discovered no
district judge who had included the point in a standard order, in-
struction, or practice. Second, it is difficult to understand why trial
judges, upon proper motion to compel answer in accordance with the
current requirement of Federal Rule 33(c)-that the respondent fur-
nishing business records "specify the records from which the answer
may be derived,"-do not order "specification [in] ...sufficient
detail" for the interrogator to match the relevant documents to the
relevant interrogatory. Perhaps a specific direction will lead counsel
to expect, and judges to demand, what should be obvious.
2. Depositions
The local rules and practices concerning depositions, authorized
by Rule 30, have been less sweeping than local rules concerning inter-
rogatories. One district judge, in an attempt to hold down the cost of
discovery, suggests to counsel that he limit deposition "to informa-
tion needed under oath."'76 He then offers the following advice:
"Interview even hostile witnesses before you depose them and then
eliminate possibly unnecessary questions such as life history and
names of all relatives since your client is paying you and a court
33(c)); see ABA CoMMrrrEE, supra note 27, at 20 (Comment to proposed Rule 33).
174. 1979 REVISED DRAIT, supra note 26, at 13-14 (proposed Rule 33(c)); see ABA
CoMmrrrEE, supra note 27, at 19-20 (same) (substantially identical language).
175. See ABA ComwrEE, supra note 27, at 21 (Comment to proposed Rule 33).
176. See SURVEY, supra note 31 (standard instruction of Judge Owens of the
Middle District of Georgia).
Another practice that could influence counsel to refrain from asking questions of
doubtful relevance is the requirement of many judges that counseloffering a deposition
at trial excise all irrelevant portions. See, e.g., E.D. VA. R. 21(E), (F); SURVEY, supra
note 31 (standing orders of Judges Schnacke and Williams of the Northern District of
California; standard pretrial order of Judges Guy, Kaess, and Joiner of the Eastern
District of Michigan; standing order of Judge Alsop of the District of Minnesota;
standing order of Judge Walinski of the Northern District of Ohio; standing order of
Eastern Division of the Southern District of Ohio).
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reporter. Holding costs down will benefit you and your client." The
judge further advises that, "if [counsel] think unnecessary deposi-
tions are being taken," counsel should "suggest that to the court
and consideration will be given to limiting their taking."'
Several districts have, in addition, defined the requirement im-
posed by Federal Rule 30(b) that "reasonable notice" be given of the
taking of a deposition. Some require a minimum of five days,' others
ten days,179 unless the court orders a shorter time. One district re-
quires a longer time if the deposition is to be taken more than fifty
miles away. 8
Two courts, concerned about the inconvenience caused to a non-
resident party forced to travel a great distance for the purpose of a
deposition, have promulgated a "general policy" that "a non-resident
plaintiff may reasonably be deposed at least once in this District
during the discovery stages of the case."'' 1 In the Middle District of
Florida, a "non-resident defendant who intends to be present in per-
son at trial may reasonably be deposed at least once in this District
during the discovery stages of the case or within a week prior to trial
as the circumstances seem to suggest."'82 Any other nonresident party
may be deposed as a witness pursuant to Rule 45(d) of the Federal
Rules." Thus, in the Northern District of Florida, any nonresident
defendant, and in Middle Florida, any nonresident defendant who
does not intend to appear in person at trial and any nonresident
plaintiff beyond the first deposition, may be deposed in the district
where suit is brought only if subpoenaed and if the subpoena is served
in the district or within forty miles of the district.'84 Although intent
to avoid inconvenience may be admirable, these local rules appear to
177. See SURVEY, supra note 31 (standard instruction of Judge Owens of the
Middle District,of Georgia).
178. See, e.g., D. KAN. R. 17(b). E.D. VA. R. 21(G) provides that seven days
"shall constitute reasonable notice," but this is to vary "according to the complexity
of the contemplated testimony and the urgency of taking the deposition of a party or
witness at a particular time and place."
179. See, e.g., M.D. FLA. GEN. R. 3.02; SURVEY, supra note 31 (standing order of
Chief Judge Nealon of the Middle District of Pennsylvania, para. 4.2).
180. D.D.C. Civ. R. 1.16(b).
181. N.D. FLA. GEN. R. 8(B); M.D. FLA. GEN. R. 3.04(d). The Northern District
defines a "non-resident" as a person who lives outside the Northern District of Florida.
The Middle District defines "non-resident" as one who lives outside the State of
Florida.
182. M.D. FLA. GEN. R. 3.04(d).
183. The corresponding local rules are N.D. FLA. GEN. R. 8(B); M.D. FLA. GEN.
R. 3.04(d).
184. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d).
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be directly contrary to Federal Rules 30(a) and (b)'" and 37(d)'8I and
are of questionable validity. '
Two other solicitous courts provide for payment of expenses
when a deposition is to be taken at a distant place. One provides that,
if a deposition is to be taken more than 150 miles from the federal
courthouse, the court "may provide" in a protective order that the
party noticing the deposition pay the expenses of attending, includ-
ing the reasonable fees of one attorney for the adverse party.'" The
other provides that, if a deposition that will be used at trial is taken
outside the division of the court in which the action is pending, the
party noticing the deposition "shall. . . prepay or secure the cost of
travel" of one opposing counsel to the place of deposition and re-
turn.'"' Although a court may have the power to issue such an order
in an individual case, acting under its authority to issue a protective
order,"' it appears to be beyond the court's power to exact such a
price as an ordinary matter in every case. The protective order rule
contemplates that the court weigh the respective hardships in each
individual case and place at least the initial burden on the person
seeking the protective order. These local rules make the protective
order the norm, with the burden of its non-application on the party
seeking discovery. For that reason, these rules are of doubtful valid-
ity.
The most frequently adopted rule regarding depositions concerns
185. The relevant portions of Rule 30 state:
After commencement of the action, any party may take the testimony of any
person, including a party, by deposition upon oral examination .... The
attendance of witnesses may be compelled by subpoena as provided in Rule
45.
FED. R. Ctv. P. 30(a).
A party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon oral examina-
tion shall give reasonable notice in writing to every other party to the action.
The notice shall state the time and place for taking the deposition and the
name and address of each person to be examined, if known, and, if the name
is not known, a general description sufficient to identify him or the particular
class or group to which he belongs. If a subpoena duces tecum is to be served
on the person to be examined, the designation of the material to be pro-
duced as set forth in the subpoena shall be attached to or included in the
notice.
FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1).
186. Federal Rule 37(d) provides that if a party fails to appear before the officer
who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper notice, the court in which
the action is pending on motion may take facts to be established as presented by the
adverse party, refuse the delinquent party the privilege of supporting certain claims
or defenses, strike out all or any part of any pleading of that party, dismiss the action
or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a judgment by default against that party.
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(d).
187. See notes 29 & 117 supra.
188. N.D. ILL. Civ. R. 4(a). For a similar provision for depositions more than 100
miles from the courthouse, see S.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 5(a).
189. E.D. VA. R. 21(B)-(C). Certain limits are placed on those expenses and fees.
190. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
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whether a deposition filed in court is open for all to see and, if not,
who may open it. Federal Rule 30(f) now provides that when a deposi-
tion is transcribed,"' the officer before whom the deposition was
taken is to certify it, "then securely seal the deposition in an enve-
lope" and file it or mail it to the clerk for filing in the court where
the action is pending. The Federal Rule makes no mention of unseal-
ing. A few district courts provide that, when the sealed deposition is
filed, it shall be opened by the clerk. 9 2 Most provide that it shall
remain sealed. A few then state that to open the seal requires an order
of court or a stipulation of the parties."3 The vast majority provide
that the seal shall be opened upon request of any counsel in the
case.'94
The Advisory Committee and the ABA Committee made no rec-
ommendations on the matters covered by these local rules. They
have, however, proposed certain amendments to the deposition rules
that should make depositions somewhat less expensive. Their propos-
als would authorize the taking of a deposition by other than steno-
graphic means, but the Advisory Committee will require either a
stipulation or a court order upon motion."' Taking a deposition by
telephone would be authorized. 9' But the deposition, if transcribed,
would still need to be filed at that time."97
3. Requests for Production
A few local rules and individual judge practices address problems
with requests for production under Federal Rule 34. A few discourage
191. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(c) provides that a deposition shall be transcribed "if
requested by one of the parties ......
192. See, e.g., N.D. & S.D. IOWA Civ. R. 17(A); E.D. LA. R. 7; D. ME. R. 15(b);
D. MONT. R. 8(c); N.D. OHIO Civ. R. 6(b); D.R.I.R. 14(b).
193. See, e.g., D. IDAHO R. 17; D. NEv. Civ. R. 17(A)5. Cf. D. ALASKA GEN. R.
8(A)(opened by order of court or "upon request of counsel for either party").
194. See, e.g., N.D. GA. R. 210; E.D. ILL. R. 16; D. MAss. R. 14.
195. 1979 REvisED DRAFr, supra note 26, at 7 (proposed amendment to Federal
Rule 30(b)(4)). The ABA Committee proposes that non-stenographic taking of a depo-
sition be permitted solely upon notice to that effect in the notice of the deposition. See
ABA COMMrrrEE, supra note 27, at 10-14. While the Advisory Committee at first
agreed, see 1978 PROPOSED DRAFT, supra note 26, at 640, it has pulled back, stating that
it "is not satisfied that a case has been made for a reversal of present practice." 1979
REVISED DRAFT, supra note 26, at 10 (Advisory Committee Note to proposed new Fed-
eral Rule 30(b)(4)); see id. at 7. Yet, the Committee would explicitly authorize elec-
tronic recording of depositions by stipulation or order to encourage its use so that
"greater experience" might be gained. Id.
196. Id. (Rule 30(b)(1)).
197. The ABA Committee urged that the present filing requirement for deposi-
tions be changed so that they would need to be filed only when used in a court
proceeding, unless the court otherwise directs. See ABA CommrrrEE, supra note 27, at
1, 15, 17 (proposed amendments to Federal Rules 5(d), 30(f), 31(b)). The Advisory
Committee originally concurred as far as oral depositions were concerned. See 1978
PRoPosED DRAFT, supra note 26, at 642 (proposed amendment to Rule 31(b)). Without
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formal requests, urging counsel to use informal letters' 8 or to meet
informally soon after the commencement of the action and exchange
documents for purposes of inspection and copying."' One court sug-
gests that a response to a request for production shall reproduce each
request immediately before the response thereto.2 °° Two others re-
quire that, when a response to a request for production contains an
objection, it must also contain a certification that the objector has
complied with the request to the extent that it is not considered
objectionable."0 ' One court, in an apparent attempt to speed discov-
ery, requires that within fifteen days of receipt of a request for pro-
duction, a party who intends to object to all or part of that request
must file, presumably in court, a notice of intention to object to all
or part of the request."0 2 A failure to file the notice "will constitute a
waiver of the privilege of objecting." ' 3 This Rule cuts the time limit
provided by Federal Rule 34 by as much as one-half.0 4 Moreover, by
requiring filing in court by the objector, it returns to the structure
abandoned by the 1970 amendments. 5 For these reasons, this local
rule appears to be invalid.
Again, the Advisory Committee and the ABA Committee have
addressed none of these concerns. But they do urge one amendment
to Federal Rule 34. Addressing what it called the "reprehensible prac-
tice [of] . . . the deliberate attempt by a producing party to burden
discovery with volume or disarray," the ABA Committee noted that
"[iut is apparently not rare for parties deliberately to mix critical
documents with others in the hope of obscuring significance.""2
Thus, both the ABA Committee and the Advisory Committee recom-
mend the addition of the following to Federal Rule 34 (in the words
of the Advisory Committee proposal): "A party who produces docu-
ments for inspection shall produce them as they are kept in the usual
comment, the 1979 version dropped all mention of filing depositions, thus retaining the
present requirement. See 1979 REmsED DRAr, supra note 26, at 8.
198. See, e.g., SuRvFy, supra note 31 (practice of Judge Pollack of the Southern
District of New York, as indicated by the response of Ralph A. Cosenza, Minute Clerk).
The gain in efficiency yielded by use of this local rule is not apparent.
199. See, e.g., id. (Notice to Counsel of Judge Nelson of the Central District of
California.).
200. N.D. CAL. Civ. R. 230(2).
201. S.D. CAL. R. 6(c); E.D. MICH. R. XIV.
202. W.D. Mo. R. 28.
203. Id.
204. FED. R. Ctv. P. 34(b) provides 30 days in which to object and in certain
circumstances 45 days.
205. A purpose of the 1970 amendment to rule 34 was "to have the rule operate
extrajudicially," since the "extrajudicial procedure ... has the potential of saving
court time ... ." FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a), Notes of Advisory Committee on 1970 Amend-
ment, 28 U.S.C. app. 458 (1976).
206. ABA CoMmrrrEE, supra note 27, at 22 (Comment to proposed amended Rule
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course of business or shall organize and label them to correspond
with the categories in the request.""2 7
A more significant proposal is being considered by the Second
Circuit Commission on the Reduction of Burdens and Costs in Civil
Litigation.25 The Commission, concerned about the cost of producing
large masses of documents,0 9 has proposed that the district courts
each adopt a local rule which would allow the discovering party to
proceed under one of two options."' Option 1 would require the dis-
coveree, in response to a request, to divulge the location of relevant
files, identify individuals knowledgeable as to the organization and
maintenance of those files, and supply a description of the categories
of documents at each location. Provision is made for a master or
magistrate to interview or depose file personnel or even to conduct an
inspection of the files himself. The discovering party would be re-
quired to give notice of the sequence of proposed inspection of the
documents to permit the discoveree an initial review for privileged or
other confidential materials. Option 2 is simply to proceed as is now
207. 1979 RvsFm DRAFr, supra note 26, at 16.
208. See Second Circuit Commission on the Reduction of Burdens and Costs in
Civil Litigation, Proposed Local Rule 34 (Apr. 10, 1978) (unpublished draft and com-
mentary) [hereinafter cited as Second Circuit Draft].
209. The Second Circuit Commission states,
1. In any substantial case, if the lawyers do their jobs, virtually all
documents relating to the subject matters of the case will be produced. But
to get to that stage often requires an iitraordinarily and unnecessarily ex-
pensive process of voluminous, detailed requests, almost equally voluminous
and detailed objections, extensive motion practice, hearings before the mag-
istrate or the court or both, and quite possibly a series of depositions.
2. After those expenses have been incurred and orders to produce have
been issued, the party seeking production assumes the not inconsiderable
risk that documents he really wants-the damaging documents-will not be
produced. The burden of the initial file search of course falls on the opposing
party, but he has the opportunity to review files against specifically worded
requests and thus to "construe" those requests in a manner which will avoid
the production of damaging materials.
3. Aware of this risk, the party seeking production will tend to draft his
request broadly, which results in his calling for large volumes of materials
he does not really want. In most instances he will receive precisely such
materials-possibly tons of worthless paper-which the party making pro-
duction has considerable incentive to give him. That is so, because the larger
the volume of paper produced, no matter how innocuous, the stronger will
be the grounds, as a practical matter, for opposing any further document
requests.
4. In a large document case, the amount of work done by the party
receiving production-in reviewing and understanding the materials pro-
duced-may not be significantly less than the amount of work done by the
party making production. In effect, the system occasions a large duplication
of expense which. . . may well be unnecessary.
Second Circuit Draft, supra note 208, at 5-7.
210. Id. at 1-3.
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provided by Federal Rule 34, except that the court, in ruling on
objections, must take into account that the discoveror has elected not
to assume the burden and expense of the file search, preferring to
delegate that onus to the discoveree.
Under Option 1, the inordinate expense attending the legal pro-
fession's version of German chess"' appears to be effectively elimi-
nated in the area of drafting and litigating detailed document re-
quests and objections. The Commission's answer to the argument
that Option 1 enables the discoveror to view greater numbers of irrele-
vant documents and is therefore a greater invasion of privacy is a
pragmatic one: the present system already "generates production of
huge quantities of irrelevant materials. 2 1 The theory is that under
Option 1, the discoveror, being better informed, is likely to be more
selective, the more so since he performs his own file search rather
than relying on documents selected by his adversary. The Commis-
sion counters the argument that Option 2 is virtually forced upon
plaintiffs who lack the resources to cope with massive corporate
files2 13 with the obvious fact that Option 2 is in any event no more
burdensome than the limited procedures now available under Rule
34.214
The Commission's proposal is a thoughtful and realistic attempt
to deal with a discovery procedure that, even if not abused, subjects
the parties to inordinate expenditures of time and money. But it is
designed for the big or complex case and should be so limited. In
relatively simple litigation, a party should not have carte blanche
under Option 1 to roam about his opponent's files. This procedure
should be made a part of local rules that are applicable only to big
or complex cases, a precedent that the Northern District of Ohio has
already set.2 15 Whether or not that is done, the rule can and should
operate only under the close supervision of a magistrate or master,
as the Commission's draft would propose, or through early discovery
conferences as visualized in the proposed revisions to Federal Rule
26211 and in the Manual for Complex Litigation.2 1 1
211. German chess-Kriegspiel-is a variant of chess in which a player sees
only his own pieces and must deduce the position of the opponent's forces as the
referee removes captured pieces from the board.
212. Second Circuit Draft, supra note 208, at 10.
213. The Commission notes, "This argument might have had some appeal in
1946; it does not now." Id. at 9.
214. Indeed, those presently able to utilize the current system of document pro-
duction successfully can only be aided by the proposed local rule. The local rule gives
the plaintiff with limited resources who elects Option 1 the ability to control the
amount of documentation he reviews, and provides him a better idea of what his
opponent possesses than he would be able to form under the present system.
215. See text accompanying notes 122-26 supra.
216. See text accompanying notes 101-08 supra.
217. See text accompanying note 118 supra.
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4. Requests for Admissions
The Federal Rule 36 requests for admissions procedure seems to
be working well. Neither the Advisory Committee nor the ABA Com-
mittee proposed any change in Federal Rule 36 and the local rules
address only two points. One is a requirement that the person re-
sponding to a request quote the request immediately before the re-
sponse. 21 Some districts require that the propounder of the request
leave sufficient room for a response.219 Secondly, two districts require
that when a response to a request for admission contains an objection,
the response must also contain a certification that the objector an-
swered the request to the extent not considered objectionable.2 10
5. Physical or Mental Examinations
Unlike other federal discovery rules,2' Federal Rule 35, which
provides for orders for physical and mental examinations, requires a
motion and a showing of good cause. Although the Advisory Commit-
tee Note to the current version of Rule 35 contains some implication
that parties should agree on the examination without the need to
invoke judicial intervention, 2 1 only one local rule encourages this,
and then only indirectly. The Northern District of Mississippi pro-
vides that every motion for such an examination not accompanied by
a consent order must be accompanied by an affidavit of movant's
counsel stating that efforts to reach an agreement were unsuccess-
ful.22 This device is a small step in the direction of saving court time.
Neither the Advisory Committee nor the ABA Committee ad-
dressed this rule.
6. Filing Requirements
As originally promulgated in 1938, the Federal Rules did not
218. See, e.g., D. ALAsKA GEN. R. 8(E); E.D. & W.D. ARK. R. 10; C.D. CAL. R.
6(c); N.D. CAL. Civ. R. 230(3); S.D. CAL. R. 6(c); D.D.C. Civ. R. 1-9(A); D. ME. R.
16(a); D.N.D.R. IV(F)(4); N.D. OKLA. R. 10(c); W.D. OKLA. R. 9(c).
219. See, e.g., D. Aruz. Civ. R. 37(a)(2); D.N.H.R. 14(a)(1); D.N.J. GEN. R. 16;
N.D. OHIo Civ. R. 3(d).
220. S.D. CAL. R. 6(d); E.D. MICH. R. XIV.
221. The only other rule exacting such a requirement is that relating to the
taking of depositions before the commencement of an action or pending an appeal.
FED. R. Civ. P. 27.
222. The Advisory Committee Note says, "Examinations are very frequently
made by agreement and sometimes before the party examined has an attorney. The
courts have uniformly ordered that reports be supplied [however], . . . and [the new
provision specifically allowing examination by agreement] appears best to fill the
technical gap in the [pre-amendment] rule." FED. R. Civ. P. 35(b)(3), Notes of Advi-
sory Committee on 1970 Amendment, 28 U.S.C. app. 459 (1976).
223. N.D. Miss. Civ. R. C-2. Of course, other local rules requiring attempts to
reach agreement before discovery motions are filed would accomplish the same result
if applied to Rule 35 motions. See notes 52-54 supra and accompanying text.
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require the filing in court of all discovery papers. Depositions, when
transcribed," were to be filed,2 as were notices of depositions and
motions concerning discovery.2 26 There was no requirement, however,
to file interrogatories, answers to interrogatories, requests for admis-
sion or responses to such requests. The general filing requirement of
Federal Rule 5(d) extended only to "papers. . . required to be served
upon a party .... "2 As Federal Rule 5(a) did not require that
discovery papers be served, it was at least arguable that the filing
requirement of Federal Rule 5(d) did not apply.22 In 1970, however,
Federal Rule 5(a) was amended to extend service requirements to
''every paper relating to discovery required to be served upon a party
unless the court otherwise orders .... ,,2z Thus, the filing require-
ment of Federal Rule 5(d) was brought into play.
The filing requirement has proven to be quite onerous to district
court clerks' offices and an item of significant expense for counsel.
These filed papers have little application in resolving matters at trial,
since only a small fraction of civil cases that go through discovery are
actually tried. Moreover, discovery disputes seldom arise, as evi-
denced by the fact that certain important papers-motions to compel
and for protective orders, for example-are not filed in every case,
and when filed often address only specific matters within a particular
discovery request. Thus, most filings of discovery documents serve,
at best, only the limited purpose of furnishing a relatively official
copy of the documents should a question arise as to authenticity.
Some district courts insist that counsel carry out the literal re-
quirement of Federal Rule 5 that all papers relating to discovery be
filed. Two districts even prohibit the parties from stipulating that
224. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(1938) provided that a deposition "shall be taken steno-
graphically and transcribed unless the parties agree otherwise." The 1970 amendments
changed this to require transcription only if one of the parties so requested.
225. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(f) (1938).
226. FED. R. Civ. P. 5(a), (d)(1938).
227. FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d)(1938).
228. The contrary was also arguable, as Federal Rules 33 and 36 did require
service of interrogatories and requests for admissions and responses thereto. FED. R.
Civ. P. 33, 36 (1938).
229. The purpose apparently was to ensure that in a multiple-party case discov-
ery papers between two of the parties were served on all parties. No attention seemed
to be given to the impact this would have on filing. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 5(a), Notes of
Advisory Committee on 1970 Amendment, 28 U.S.C. app. 401 (1976).
230. See, e.g., D.N.H.R. 14; D.N.J.R. 15(C); S.D.N.Y. GEN. R. 6(c). D. ALAsKA
GEN. R. 8(C), not only insists that interrogatories and answers be filed, but states
further that "[a]ll documents, photographs, maps or diagrams attached to such inter-
rogatories or answers shall likewise be filed with the Clerk." D. ALAsKA GEN. R. 8(B)
also provides that depositions shall be lodged and not filed with the Clerk and "shall
be kept separately [from the file folder] and noted in the docket of the case." This
rule is apparently to help preserve the secrecy of the deposition, see D. ALAsKA GEN.
R. 8(A), and not for any reason of efficiency.
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a transcribed deposition not be filed.Y' The Northern District of Illi-
nois provides a sanction for failure to file: the use of an unfiled deposi-
tion "for any purpose" is barred. 2
Other districts, by contrast, have attempted to ameliorate the
requirements of Federal Rule 5(d). Two districts provide that interro-
gatories and answers thereto shall not be filed except where they
become the subject of court consideration through a motion to compel
answer, or presumably, a motion to protect.2 And two other districts
provide that interrogatories shall not be filed when served but that
the respondent shall file the interrogatories along with the respon-
ses.2u
The District of Puerto Rico supplies an interesting example of
the problems encountered by a district court desiring to stay within
the letter of the Federal Rules even when a different approach is
called for. Its local rule 10 provides that "unless expressly required
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, papers relating to any dis-
covery proceedings need not be filed with the Court."' 5 Since Federal
Rule 5(d) provides that all papers relating to discovery shall be filed,
the "unless" clause would seem to nullify the rest of the sentence.
Moreover, another portion of Puerto Rico's local rule 10 makes it clear
that the filing exemption of the first sentence is meant to apply only
to depositions: "However, every time a discovery document is served
upon an opposing counsel, proof of service must be filed with the U.S.
District Court. The pertinent parts of interrogatories, notices to pro-
duce documents or requests for admission, for which rulings are
sought, must be included in the motion papers."1
Both the ABA Committee and, originally, the Advisory Com-
mittee recognized that the costs of providing additional copies of dis-
covery materials for court filing can be considerable and the storage
problems faced by clerks' offices in some districts are serious. There-
fore, both committees recommended an amendment to Federal Rule
5(d) to provide that, unless filing is ordered by the court on motion
of a party or upon its own motion, depositions upon oral examination
and interrogatories and requests for admission and the answers
231. D. ME. R. 15(b); D.R.I.R. 14(b).
232. N.D. ILL. GEN. R. 18(c). D.N.D.R. X(A) (if a party fails to file any paper
required by Federal Rule 5(d) within five days of service, the court may order the paper
to be filed forthwith, and, if the order is not obeyed, the court may order the paper
stricken and the service to be without effect).
233. S.D. OHIO R. 3.7.1; D.N.M.R. 10(d).
234. M.D. FLA. GEN. R. 3.03(c); W.D. PA. R. 4(b). As both districts provide that
the propounder of interrogatories shall leave room after each interrogatory reasonably
calculated to be sufficient for the answer or objection, see M.D.. FLA. GEN. R. 3.03(b);





thereto need not be filed unless and until they are used in the pro-
ceedings.27 The Advisory Committee however, in its 1979 Revised
Draft, dropped all reference to filing requirements, thus leaving the
current requirement intact. The Committee offered no explanation
for its change of view.m As in earlier instances, though, some district
courts have already acted. 5 In view of the express language of Rule
5(d), and particularly in view of the Advisory Committee's action,
one can easily conclude that these local rules exceed the power of the
district courts.
V. ENFORCEMENT AND SANCTIONS
Federal Rule 37 provides a full range of sanctions against a party
or a nonparty deponent who fails to furnish discovery as required by
the rules. But no such sanctions are available for use against a party
who overuses or misuses the discovery process.2 1 It is of interest that
this omission was not corrected when the rules were rewritten a de-
cade ago. Indeed, the Advisory Committee found7A' only "defects in
the language of the rule as well as instances in which it is not serving
the purposes for which it was designed.'4 2 Thus, the 1970 amend-
ments to Rule 37 were really perfecting amendments to remove these
237. See 1978 PRoPoSED Darr, supra note 26, at 622; ABA COMMrrrEE, supra
note 27, at 1.
238. Objection to the proposed amendment to Federal Rule 5(d) on the ground
that it will reduce the public's access to materials in civil cases has been made in un-
published statements of Division Four of the District of Columbia Bar, and of the
Public Citizen Litigation Group on the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules
of Practice and Procedure, U.S. Judicial Conference. This objection rests upon an
asserted common-law right "to inspect and copy public records and documents, in-
cluding judicial records and documents." Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435
U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (footnote omitted). This, of course, begs the issue as to when dis-
covery documents become public. It seems strange that such a common-law right,
which the Supreme Court noted has existed since at least 1894, see id. at 597 nn.7 &
8, would arguably attach beyond removal to discovery documents which, prior to July
1970, were not to be filed until used in court, see text accompanying notes 224-29
supra, and hence were not public until that time.
239. See, e.g., N.D. GA. R. 181; S.D. GA. R. 7; M.D.N.C. Civ. R. 21(m).
240. The Advisory Committee noted in 1978 that "[r]ule 37 now authorizes
sanctions only against those who refuse to make discovery without justification. It
does not directly reach those who make unreasonable demands for discovery." 1978
PROPoSED DRAvr, supra note 26, at 653 (Advisory Committee Note to proposed Rule
37(e)). This language has been dropped from the 1979 Revised Draft now before the
bar. See also ABA CommrrEE, supra note 27, at 24-25 (Comment to its proposed
Rule 37(e)).
241. FED. R. Civ. P. 37, Notes of Advisory Committee on 1970 Amendment, 28




difficulties. Of particular interest was language limiting the cost
sanction contained within the Rule to discourage the bringing of dis-
covery disputes to court.243 While the Advisory Committee spoke of
this cost device as "intended to encourage judges to be more alert to
abuses occurring in the discovery process," the abuses it referred to
were those "implicit in carrying or forcing a discovery dispute to court
when no genuine dispute exists." 44
One district, the Western District of Tennessee, has supple-
mented Rule 37 by providing that filing of unnecessary deposition or
discovery motions, applications, requests, or objections will subject
the offender to appropriate sanctions, including imposition of costs
and counsel fees.245
Two district courts go further. The District of Alaska, by local
rule, warns that any attorney
who presents to the Court unnecessary motions or unwarranted op-
position to motions ... or who otherwise so multiplies the proceed-
ings in any case as to increase the costs thereof unreasonably and
vexatiously, may be required by the Court to satisfy personally such
excess costs and may be subject to such other discipline as the Court
may deem appropriate.26
The District of Arizona provides that failure to comply "in good faith
with the rules governing pretrial discovery" will subject a party to a
sanction which the court deems appropriate, including dismissal, de-
fault, and costs, and the court may "impose upon either counsel
further sanctions, including sanctions for contempt of court. 2 47
A few districts have general language in their rules that can form
the basis for sanctions applicable to the discovery process. For exam-
ple, the Central District of California provides that "violation of or
failure to conform to any of these local rules"-which include certain
matters having to do with discovery24 -"shall subject the offending
party and his attorney, at the discretion of the court, to appropriate
discipline," including costs and attorney's fees. 24 The Eastern Cali-
243. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4).
244. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4), Notes of Advisory Committee on 1970 Amend-
ment, 28 U.S.C. app., at 464 (1976). The Advisory Committee referred to the facts
that until that time only a handful of reported cases included an award of expenses;
and the Columbia Survey, see FwLD SuRvEY, supra note 9, found that in only two
percent of the motions decided under Rule 37(a) did the court award expenses.
Whether the 1970 amended version of Rule 37(a)(3) works any better is not known.
See notes 262-70 infra and accompanying text.
245. W.D. TENN. R. 9(c).
246. D. ALASKA GEN. R. 35(D).
247. D. ARIz. Civ. R. 42(E).
248. See C.D. CAL. R. 6.
249. See C.D. CAL. R. 28.
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fornia district phrases it this way: "Failure of counsel or of a party
to comply with these rules shall be ground for any imposition by the
Court of any and all sanctions authorized by statute or rule," includ-
ing fines, costs, and attorney's fees, "as may be within the power of
the court."' 0
All other local rules dealing with sanctions do so in the context
of failure to prosecute. Many do no more than repeat the general
language of Federal Rule 41(b) that failure to prosecute can lead to
dismissal. 2 1 Others provide a certain time guide: the case will be
dismissed if it is pending "without any substantial proceedings of
record having been taken"' 2 or if "no activity by filing of pleadings,
orders of the Court or otherwise" 23 has occurred during the time
specified. The time provided varies: three months,24 six months,25
one year,26 and fifteen months."7 Both Iowa districts provide that
whenever any deadline set by the Federal Rules, by the local rules,
or by order of any federal court is exceeded by more than thirty days
and extension has neither been requested nor granted, the action
"shall be dismissed by the clerk."' ' 5 Each of these Iowa rules provides
for notice to counsel in advance of dismissal, though Northern Geor-
gia allows dismissal "with or without notice."' 9
The Alaska, Arizona, and Eastern Michigan rules providing for
sanctions directly against counsel who "multiplies the proceedings
. . . [so] as to increase the costs unreasonably and vexatiously" or
who fails to comply in good faith with the rules governing pretrial
discovery, s have a statutory foundation. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides:
"Any attorney. . .who so multiples the proceedings in any case as
to increase the costs unreasonably and vexatiously may be required
by the court to satisfy personally such excess costs. '2' 1
The Advisory Committee and the ABA Committee have pro-
250. E.D. CAL. GEN. R. 5. See also E.D. MIci. R. XXVII(b) ("If counsel fails to
comply with any of these rules," the court may assess costs directly against counsel
"whose action has obstructed the effective administration of the Court's business, and
subject him to such other discipline as the Court may deem appropriate.").
251. See, e.g., D. CoLo. R. 19; D.D.C. Civ. R. 1-14; M.D. FLA. GEN. R. 3.10; D.
KAN. R. 26.
252. N.D. GA. R. 131.13.
253. N.D. FLA. GEN. R. 13.
254. See, e.g., N.D. FLA. GN. R. 13; M.D. LA. GEN. R. 17(B). S.D. FLA. GEN. R.
13 specifies three months before issue.
255. See, e.g., N.D. CAL. Civ. R. 235(11); S.D. CAL. R. 10; N.D. GA. R. 131.13;
N.D. ILL. GEN. R. 21(a); E.D.. LA. R. 12.
256. See, e.g., D. ARIZ. Civ. R. 38(d); N.D. IND. R. 10; D. MD. SuPP. R. 33.
257. See, e.g., E.D. Mo. R. VIII(f).
258. N.D. & S.D. IOWA Civ. R. 24(B).
259. N.D. GA. R. 131.1.
260. D. ALASKA GEN. R. 35D; see D. ARIZ. Civ. R. 38(d); E.D. MICH. R. XXVII(b).
261. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976).
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posed an expansion of Federal Rule 37 sanctions so as to apply to
failure to "cooperate in" discovery as well as to "failure to make"
discovery. In 1978, they each proposed that a new Federal Rule 37(e)
be promulgated, authorizing the court, in addition to other sanctions
already authorized in Rule 37, to "impose upon any party or counsel
such sanctions as may be just, including the payment of reasonable
expenses and attorney's fees," for the following: "(1) fails without
good cause to cooperate in the framing of an appropriate discovery
plan by agreement under Rule 26(f), or (2) otherwise abuses the dis-
covery process in seeking, making or resisting discovery." ' More-
over, proposed Federal Rule 37(e) was to make explicit reference to
28 U.S.C. § 1927.263
The Advisory Committee, however, without explanation or
comment, pulled back in its 1979 Revised Draft. While currently
proposed new Rule 37(e) explicitly authorizes a court to impose costs
on a party or an attorney who "fails to participate in good faith in
the framing of a discovery plan by agreement," it fails to provide the
same remedy for the abuse of other portions of the discovery process
and eliminates all reference to 28 U.S.C. § 1927.264 Presumably sec-
tion 1927 sanctions are available, but the failure to provide an express
reference in Rule 37 will make its use less likely.
It must be noted that the provision of a sanction in a rule is not
the whole answer. Section 1927 has been the law since 1813, yet,
there are very few reported instances of its utilization.2 5 The cost
sanctions of pre-1970 Rule 37 were used in only one of fifty cases. 2"1
And, while no exhaustive research has yet been published, 2  there
262. 1978 PROPOSED DRAFr, supra note 26, at 652; see ABA COMMITrEE, supra
note 27, at 24-25. The Advisory Committee noted: "The new subdivision is offered to
make explicit the power of the court to impose sanctions for all forms of discovery
abuse." 1978 PROPOSED DRAkv, supra note 26, at 653 (Note to proposed Rule 37(e)).
263. 1978 PROPOSED DRAFr, supra note 26, at 653 (Note to proposed Rule 37(e)).
The Advisory Committee noted that, although the section 1927 sanction has been
available to check discovery abuse, it has not been customarily used. Id. The explicit
reference in Rule 37(c) apparently was designed to encourage district courts to utilize
that sanction where appropriate.
264. 1979 REVISED DRAFr, supra note 26, at 19.
265. Act of July 22, 1813, ch. 14 § 3, 3 Stat. 21 (1813). See generally Risinger,
Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. Rav. 1, 47-50 (1976). Professor Risinger notes
that the statute did not figure in a reported case for over ninety years after its enact-
ment, and then only peripherally. See Risinger, supra, at 47 n.158 (referring to In re
Zier & Co., 127 F. 399 (D. Ind. 1904), aff'd, 142 F. 102 (7th Cir. 1905)). Professor
Risinger describes the number of cases decided under the statute as "few." Risinger,
supra, at 48. This is consonant with the Advisory Committee's conclusion that the
statute is not "customarily used." 1978 PROPOSED DRAFr, supra note 26, at 653 (Ad-
visory Committee Note to proposed Federal Rule 37(e)).
266. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3), Notes of Advisory Committee on 1970 Amend-
ment, 28 U.S.C. app. at 464 (1976).
267. Such a study is now underway, at the direction of Professor Ronald Elling-
ton of the University of Georgia, under the auspices of the*Department of Justice's
Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice.
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is reason to believe that the situation has not changed appreciably
since 1970.2s
An analogous situation exists with Federal Rule 11, which re-
quires counsel to sign all pleadings to certify they have "read the
pleading, that to the best of [their] knowledge, information and
belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed
for-delay." 6 ' Professor Risinger has concluded that, since its pro-
mulgation in 1938, there have been only eleven reported cases of Rule
11 violations.20
Should the proposed new Federal Rule 37(e) be promulgated, the
responsibility for its effectuation will fall on district judges. Only they
ensure that sanctions will deter discovery abuses. If the performance
of district judges in applying 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and Federal Rule 11
is any guide, the proposed amendment to Rule 37, if adopted, will be
no more than an interesting academic exercise.
CONCLUSION
This survey of local rules and of standing orders, instructions,
and practices of individual federal judges shows that there has been
a significant amount of experimentation designed to make the discov-
ery rules better achieve the goal of "just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action."'7 Such experimentation has not,
however, been without cost. As the subject matter of district court
rulemaking has continued to expand, many courts have endangered
"the principles of simplicity, scarcity and uniformity which guided
the formulation of the Federal Rules," 2 and have threatened to cre-
ate "a kind of procedural Tower of Babel. ' ' 2 3 In an era in which
lawyers often practice before federal courts in more than one district,
the welter of local rules also increases the possibility that attorneys
will not be aware of rules that "might well affect an attorney's trial
tactics."' 1 Moreover, as has been indicated, many of the local rules
and practices of individual judges are inconsistent with the Federal
Rules and hence are invalid.
The local rules and practice, however, do indicate areas of con-
cern that have developed under the Federal Rules. They also demon-
strate attempts to limit the involvement of judges in the discovery
process and thus conserve judge time available for trial and more
substantive motions. Clearly, this is consonant with the thrust of the
268. See Risinger, supra note 265, at 47-48.
269. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
270. Risinger, supra note 265, at 34-42.
271. FED. R. Crv. P. 1.
272. Note, Rule 83 and the Local Federal Rules, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1251, 1252
(1967)(footnotes omitted). For some concrete examples of this type of rules, see text
accompanying notes 141-62, 178-84, 188-89 supra.
273. 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 220.
274. Weinstein, supra note 29, at 958 n.309.
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1970 amendments to the Federal Rules.25 Yet, there is a contrary
impetus, one that brings federal judges, or federal magistrates, into
greater involvement in the discovery process. For, in the views of
many, allowing counsel to implement discovery largely on their own
has led to too many instances of abuse, foot dragging, and unwar-
ranted expense. Therefore, many local rules and individual judge
practices call for greater involvement of judges and magistrates. This
tendency may be seen in local rules requiring discovery conferences,
delimiting the scope of discovery at an early stage, limiting the num-
ber of interrogatories without specific court authorization, and in-
creasing the emphasis on sanctions.
The current proposals of the Advisory Committee, the ABA
Committee, and the Second Circuit Commission also propose a sig-
nificant increased investment in judge time to ensure that the discov-
ery process works more expeditiously and less expensively. Although
much of the increased supervision may be performed by magistrates
or, as in the case of one Second Circuit Commission proposal, volun-
teer masters, the current proposals, by calling for increased supervi-
sion of counsel, reverses the philosophy behind the 1970 amendments
to the federal discovery rules. This fact should be recognized and
confronted.278
This survey of local rules and practices demonstrates that many
of the proposals for changes in the national rules have been the sub-
jects of experiments on the local level. In evaluating the probable
effectiveness, impact, and costs of these proposals, it is therefore
necessary to evaluate how similar rules and practices have been work-
ing on the local level. It is particularly important to balance the cost
of local rules in terms of judge time against their efficacy in solving
perceived problems. Apparently, the Federal Judicial Center's Case
Management Study 7 played a significant role in the Advisory Com-
mittee's change of position from its 1978 proposals to its 1979 revised
proposals for changes in the federal discovery rules? 8 Unfortunately,
there is no indication that the Advisory Committee, the ABA Com-
mittee, or the Second Circuit Commission went further to evaluate
local rules in arriving at the current proposals now before the bar. If
such an evaluation was in fact made, its results have not been shared
publicly.
275. See text accompanying notes 9-16 supra.
276. Compare a suggestion made from time to time that a proposed congressional
enactment carry with it a statement projecting its impact on the judiciary. Burger,
State of the Judiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 933 (1970).
277. See note 62 supra.
278. See 1979 REVISED DurAT, supra note 26, at 5 (Advisory Committee Note to
proposed new Federal Rule 26(f)). The Committee reported being impressed by the
evaluation of the Case Management Study found in P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLOMAN & M.
KUHLMAN, JUmICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LMGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY (1978).
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From this survey and from material gathered in the Case Man-
agement Study of the Federal Judicial Center, as well as from com-
mon experience of litigators, it is clear that the just administration
of the civil discovery rules cannot be accomplished by any simple
rubric that relegates discovery to counsel, that involves the court
more or less, or that enacts ever more explicit sanctions. The proper
implementation of the discovery process must instead be founded on
a process of experience. This has been the history of the Federal Rules
and of the local rules. Experience has demonstrated that the present
scheme of minimal judge involvement in the Federal Rules does not
work in the big and complex case. The Manual for Complex
Litigation ' recognized this failure and accordingly called for greater
judicial involvement in complex cases. By emphasizing problems now
perceived in the discovery process, particularly in big and complex
cases, the Advisory Committee and the Second Circuit Commission
have testified that the Manual for Complex Litigation has not been
applied sufficiently by district judges or has not worked. Yet, they
propose more of the same.
Finally, a recurring theme: for any set of rules to work there must
be counsel who are willing to make them work, even at the expense
of a client's interest. Thus, counsel's duty to the profession and to the
litigation process must temper the classic view of devotion to one's
client's interest "though the heavens fall."' 0 Moreover, there must be
a trial judge, or magistrate, alert to rules of the game and ready and
willing to enforce them when breach occurs. Without these ingredi-
ents, no set of rules, federal or local, can be more than exhortation.
279. See note 118 supra.
280. M. FREEDMAN, LAwyERs' ETmIcs IN AN ADvERSARY SysEM 9 (1975). Professor
Freedman quotes Lord Brougham in Queen Caroline's Case, 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (1820)
(quoting 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (J. Nightingale ed. London 1821) (defense trial
reported)):
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the
world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst
them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he
must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring
upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he
must go on reckless of the consequences, though it should be his unhappy
fate to involve his country in confusion.
Professor Freedman goes on to state,
Let justice be done-that is, for my client let justice be done-though the
heavens fall. That is the kind of advocacy that I would want as a client and
that I feel bound to provide as an advocate. The rest of the picture, however,
should not be ignored. The adversary system ensures an advocate on the
other side, and an impartial judge over both. Despite the advocate's argu-
ment, therefore, the heavens do not really have to fall-not unless justice
requires that they do.
M. FREEDMAN, supra at 9.
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